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On August 22, 1996, President Clinton signed into law the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 ("PRA"), 1
which aimed, as its name suggests, to reform the welfare system into "a second
chance, not a way of life."2 The sweeping law attempted to break the cycle of
welfare dependency among the poor by severely restricting eligibility for
federal benefits and instituting workplace-oriented reforms that would promote
individual self-reliance.3 Among its more controversial and landmark
measures, the law (1) cut benefits for certain legal immigrants with the explicit
justification of fostering self-reliance and reducing the public assistance
incentive to immigrate to the United States;4 (2) limited benefits to children by
requiring that single parents find work after two years on welfare or risk losing
benefits;5 and (3) required states to create workfare programs by penalizing
those states that fail to move half their caseloads into some work activity by
2002.6 In a further twist, the law delegated to states the entire implementation
of welfare programs. States were given one year to comply with the reform
measures, or they risked losing federal assistance.'
While a year has passed since the enactment of the law, it is still difficult
to determine what protections are available to three vulnerable groups under
the law: legal immigrants, children, and workfare recipients. Pronouncements
of the law's effectiveness on its first anniversary were preliminary. With few
state programs in effect and even fewer legal challenges to the state programs,
assessments that welfare enrollment numbers decreased were more than likely
based on the "announcement effect" of the law-anxious welfare recipients
1. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No.104-193, 110
Stat. 2105 (1996) [hereinafter PRA] (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
2. Elizabeth Shogren, ClintonAcceptsBroad Welfare Changes as "LastBest Chance," L.A. TIMES,
Aug. 1, 1996, at Al. For a discussion of the policy considerations behind the welfare reform law, see
Nichola L. Marshall, The Welfare Reform Act of 1996: Political Compromise or Panacea for Welfare
Dependency?, 4 GEo. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 333, 333-35, 339-41 (1997).
3. Legislators touted the law as eliminating an older system that had created dependency.
Representative E. Clay Shaw, Jr., the primary author of the GOP welfare overhaul, hailed the passage
of the welfare reform law as "independence day for those who have been trapped in a system.., which
has corrupted their souls and stolen their futures." Marshall, supra note 2, at 333. Implicating the old
welfare system in breeding dependency, Representative John Kasich, Republican Chairman of the House
Budget Committee, declared it a "sin to continue to help people who need to learn to help themselves."
Id. at 340.
4. See PRA § 412; see also infra note 16.
5. See PRA § 824(a) (amending Food Stamp Act of 1997, 7 U.S.C. 2015).
6. See Barbara Vobejda, Workfare Must Pay Minimum Wage, White House Says; State Authorities
Complain Ruling May Hamper Efforts to Move People Off Welfare, WASH. POST, May 17, 1997, at A6.
7. See id.
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fleeing the system out of fear-than the effectiveness of particular welfare-to-
work programs. Thus, while on August 13, 1997, President Clinton declared
a hands-down victory for the new law based on decreased welfare enrollment,9
the complex legal and political issues that vulnerable groups face are just
beginning to emerge with the introduction of state programs. These issues are
yet to be resolved. The year following the enactment of welfare reform has
marked an increase in the number of states implementing programs under the
law; legal challenges to these programs under state, federal, and constitutional
law; and legislative and executive amendments to the law. These changes
provide new evidence by which to judge the impact of the law on legal
immigrants, children, and workfare recipients. For example, states such as
New York and California now offer implementing laws that differ widely in
their approaches to job-training and workfare programs. 10 A legal challenge
to the New York implementing law in the Southern District of New York
represents one of the first federal court decisions on the federal law's
immigrant provisions."' And two formal amendments to the law came this
year in the form of the Balanced Budget Act, 2 returning disability benefits
to the class of legal immigrants that had previously received them, and a
presidential directive that required states to pay the minimum wage to workfare
recipients. "
This installment of Developments in Policy will focus on defining the issues
faced by legal immigrants, children, and workfare recipients in light of these
changes and analyzing the legal and political options available to these groups.
The Article is organized into three Parts. Each Part is written independently
and represents perspectives of its author or authors within the larger debate
addressed by each. Part I will analyze the updated legal challenges available
to non-citizens denied benefits under the law. It considers the constitutional
powers of the federal government to make distinctions among groups of aliens
8. See Virginia Ellis, State's Wefare Recipients Leaving Rolls in Record Numbers, SACRAMENTO
BEE, Oct. 9, 1997, at A7.
9. President Clinton hailed the progress of the welfare reform law on its first anniversary, saying,
"I think it's fair to say the debate is over: We know that welfare reform works. We now have the
smallest percentage of Americans living on public assistance since 1970." Elizabeth Shogren, Welfare
Reform is Working, L.A. TiMES, Aug. 13, 1997, at A15.
10. For the text of New York City's ambitious workfare program, "New York City Work,
Accountability, You" ("NYC WAY"), see N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 164(1) (McKinney Supp. 1997).
For an extensive discussion of the NYC WAY workfare provisions, see Patricia A. Quigley, Note,
Protection of Existing Workers and the Implementation of "Workfare, " 14 HOFSrRA LAB. L.J. 625, 636
(1997). For a comparison to the newer California plan, which went into effect on January 1, 1998, see
Ellis, supra note 8, at A7.
11. See Abreu v. Callahan, 971 F. Supp. 799 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); see also infra notes 59-65 and
accompanying text.
12. Balanced Budget Act, Pub. L. No. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251 (1997); see Judith Havemann,
Noncitizen Immigrants RetainAid in Budget Bills; Disability Benefits Restored by House, Senate, WASH.
PosT, July 1, 1997, at Al.
13. See Vobejda, supra note 6.
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in the distribution of federal benefits, the states to distinguish among aliens in
the distribution of state and federal benefits, and the federal government to
delegate to states the authority to make distinctions among different groups of
aliens in the distribution of public benefits.
Part II will analyze the effect of the federal law on state child welfare
programs. In particular, it will study the conflict that states face between a
common law duty to protect children under the doctrine of parens patriae and
a mandate to cut welfare benefits for children under the welfare reform law.
After evaluating the harmful implications of this conflict for the status of
children who have been denied benefits under the federal law, the Part will
offer policy reasons for challenging state programs under the federal law. Part
I will overview the legal and policy arguments for allowing workfare
recipients to unionize and the implication of unionization for workfare workers
and nonworkfare, unionized labor.
Challenges to the federal law and state implementing laws are being
churned out week by week and will continue to rise as state programs are only
now being passed, signed, and effected. It is this very early stage in the
implementation of the federal law to which these Parts respond in their
conception of possible challenges to and policy implications of the PRA.
-Gail P Dave
I. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO THE IMMIGRANT PROVISION OF THE
WELFARE REFORM LAW
In keeping with the PRA's emphasis on fostering self-sufficiency, the
provisions regarding aliens make two major changes in welfare policy. They
curtail certain federal benefits, and they dramatically increase state discretion
over both federal and state benefits. Because the PRA enacts drastic cutbacks
and authorizes unprecedented state discretion, it raises several constitutional
questions.
The following section begins with a summary of the provisions of the PRA
and the Balanced Budget Act 4 that are most relevant to benefits for immi-
grants. A discussion of three significant constitutional questions raised by the
PRA follows: first, whether the federal government can legally make
distinctions among different groups of aliens in the provision of federal
benefits; second, whether states can, with federal authorization, make
distinctions among different groups of aliens in the provision of state or federal
benefits; and third, whether the federal government can delegate to the states
the authority to make distinctions among different groups of aliens in the
provision of state or federal benefits.
14. Pub. L. No. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251 (1997).
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A. Summary of Title IV of the PRA and the Balanced Budget Act
Title IV"5 of the PRA establishes the restrictions on public benefits for
aliens. In enacting this Title, Congress emphasized the goals of encouraging
immigrant self-sufficiency and removing incentives for illegal immigration.16
To achieve these goals, the statute both denies some benefits outright and
delegates to states discretion over other varieties of benefits. Prior to the PRA's
enactment, there was no bar to eligibility for Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC), food stamps, and Medicaid for legal permanent residents,
refugees, and asylees.17 Illegal immigrants were not eligible, however, for
15. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act tit. IV, 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1601,
1611-1615, 1621-1624, 1631-1632, 1641-1645 (West Supp. 1997).
16. The statute outlines these goals as follows:
(1) Self-sufficiency has been a basic principle of United States immigration law since this
country's earliest immigration statutes.
(2) It continues to be the immigration policy of the United States that-
(A) aliens within the Nation's borders not depend on public resources to meet their
needs, but rather rely on their own capabilities and the resources of their families,
their sponsors, and private organizations, and
(B) the availability of public benefits not constitute an incentive for immigration to the
United States.
(C) Despite the principle of self-sufficiency, aliens have been applying for and
receiving public benefits from Federal, State, and local governments at increasing
rates.
(D) Current eligibility rules for public assistance and unenforceable financial
support agreements have proved wholly incapable of assuring that individual aliens
not burden the public benefits system.
(E) It is a compelling government interest to enact new rules for eligibility and
sponsorship agreements in order to assure that aliens be self-reliant in accordance
with national immigration policy.
(F) It is a compelling government interest to remove the incentive for illegal
immigration provided by the availability of public benefits.
8 U.S.C.A. § 1601(1)-(6); see also Holly Idelson, Conferees Prepare for Clash on Welfare Proposals,
54 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 1922, 1923 (1996) (discussing lawmakers' motivations for supporting
changes in aliens' eligibility).
17. See NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., Key Elements of New Immigrant Benefit Restrictions,
in IMMIGRANTS AND THE '96 WELFARE LAW: A RESOURCE MANUAL § 1, at 7 (National Immigration
Law Ctr. ed., 1996); Immigrant Policy Project, National Conference of State Legislatures, Immigration
Provisions in Welfare Reform: P.L. 104-193 (last modified Sept. 17, 1996) <http://www.ncsl.org/-
statefed/welf-web.htm>. Under the PRA, a sponsor's income and resources are now considered in
determining eligibility for federal means-tested programs. For these programs, a sponsor's income and
resources are considered until an alien "achieves United States citizenship," 8 U.S.C.A. § 1631(b)(1),
or "has worked 40 qualifying quarters of coverage," 8 U.S.C.A. § 163 1(b)(2)(A). See also, NATONAL
IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., supra, at 8 (noting the PRA's addition of provisions regarding the deeming
of a sponsor's income and resources for federal means-tested programs); Immigrant Policy Project,
supra (same). The PRA also added provisions affecting the circumstances under which a sponsor's
income and resources are "deemed" to be a part of the alien's income and resources for the purposes
of determining eligibility for benefits. Prior to the PRA's enactment, a sponsor's finances were
considered for three years for AFDC and Food Stamps and for five years for SSI. See NATIONAL
IMMIGRATION LAW CR., supra, at 8; Immigrant Policy Project, supra; Jeffrey L. Katz, After 60 Years,
Most Control is Passing to States, 54 CONG. Q. WKLY REP. 2190, 2193 (1996). The PRA also changed
the reporting requirements of agencies administering welfare programs. See NATIONAL IMMIGRATION
LAW CTR., supra, at 8; Immigrant Policy Project, supra. The PRA includes a provision that "no State
or local government entity may be prohibited.. . from sending to or receiving from the Immigration
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these programs.18
The PRA denies benefits depending on the immigration status of a
particular alien. Most of the provisions concern a category of immigrants,
designated as "qualified aliens," which includes legal permanent residents,
asylees, refugees, those granted withholding of deportation, and those paroled
for at least one year.19 The PRA then carves out special provisions for certain
aliens. Refugees, asylees, and aliens whose deportation is being withheld are
one such group, who for the purposes of this article will be referred to as
falling under the "political status exception." The statute also includes special
provisions for those who have worked forty qualifying quarters, who will be
referred to as falling under the "qualifying quarters exception," and for
veterans, active-duty military personnel, and their spouses and dependents, who
will be referred to as falling under the "military exception." Immigrants who
are not "qualified," as defined by the statute, are ineligible for most federal
and state benefits.
One of the PRA's most controversial provisions, the elimination of
qualified aliens' eligibility for Supplemental Security Income (SSI), prompted
Congress to include substantial modifications to the PRA in the recent Balanced
Budget Act? Under the PRA, eligibility for SSI, which provides cash
benefits for the low-income elderly and disabled,2 was to be phased out
beginning on July 1, 1997. Qualified aliens were to lose eligibility for SSI
entirely on August 22, 1997, the first anniversary of the PRA's enactment?
As the deadline neared, President Clinton and members of Congress pushed for
Balanced Budget Act provisions that would allow certain qualified aliens to
continue receiving benefits.' Subsequently, the Balanced Budget Act as
enacted substantially altered the denial of benefits to some groups.
As originally enacted, the PRA grouped SSI and food stamps under the title
and Naturalization Service information regarding the immigration status... of an alien in the United
States." 8 U.S.C.A. § 1644. New York City recently challenged the constitutionality of the new federal
reporting provisions, which preempted a New York City Ordinance that prohibited city officials from
reporting an alien's immigration status to federal authorities, alleging that the PRA violated the
constitution and principles of federalism. See City of New York v. United States, 971 F. Supp. 789,
791 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). The court ruled against the city and denied its motion. See id.
18. See NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CnR., supra note 17, at 9; Immigrant Policy Project, supra
note 17; Howard Kurtz, Presidential Campaign Ads' Pique Season Gets Early Start, WASH. POST, July
27, 1996, at Al.
19. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1641(b)(1)-(5).
20. Pub. L. No. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251 (1997).
21. See Donna Cassata et al., Roth Proposes Compromise on SSI, 55 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 1370,
1370 (1997).
22. See Controversial Provisions, 55 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 1134, 1134 (1997); Jeffrey L. Katz,
Plans on SSI Eligibility, 55 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 1450, 1450 (1997).
23. See James Bennet, Talks on Budget Yield an Accord on Disability Aid, N.Y. TIMES, July 26,
1997, at Al; Dan Carney, Republicans Feeling the Heat As Policy Becomes Reality, 55 CONG. Q.
WKLY. REP. 1131, 1131 (1997); PeterT. Kilborn, The BudgetDeal: The Scorecard, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
1, 1997, at Al.
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of "specified federal programs," and made qualified aliens ineligible for both
types of benefits.' The Balanced Budget Act restored SSI eligibility to aliens
lawfully residing in the United States who were receiving SSI benefits on the
date of. the PRA's enactment.' In addition, the Balanced Budget Act made
aliens who were lawfully residing in the United States on the date of the PRA's
passage eligible for disability-related SSI even if they became disabled after the
law's enactment.' Despite the provisions of the Balanced Budget Act,
qualified aliens remain ineligible for food stamps, qualified aliens are ineligible
for SSI benefits for the elderly unless they were receiving those benefits prior
to the PRA's enactment, and qualified aliens who became lawful residents after
August 22, 1996, are ineligible for disability-related SSI benefits. Under the
special exceptions originally stipulated in the PRA, those who fall within the
qualifying quarters exception and the military exception are eligible for SSI and
food stamps without any such time limit.27 Those who fall within the political
status exception were originally eligible for SSI and food stamps for five years
following their admission to the United States,' and the new Balanced Budget
Act has extended their SSI eligibility to seven years.29
The Balanced Budget Act also altered the PRA's original provisions
regarding programs grouped under the general category of "designated federal
programs," including the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF)
block grant, the Social Services block grant, and Medicaid.3" Under the
original version of the PRA, Congress delegated to the states the task of
determining whether qualified aliens would be eligible for designated federal
programs.3" The Balanced Budget Act altered some of the PRA's provisions
by mandating that states apply the same standards of Medicaid eligibility to
qualified aliens as are applied to citizens. 32 As with the provisions on
specified federal programs, the PRA also makes exceptions for special groups.
Those who fall within the qualifying quarters and military exceptions are
eligible without time limit.33 Those within the political status exception were
eligible under the PRA's original version for five years,3 and the Balanced
Budget Act has extended their Medicaid eligibility to seven years.35
24. 8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(1) (1997), amended by 8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(2).
25. See Balanced Budget Act, § 5301(a) (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(2)).
26. See id. § 5301(b) (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(2)).
27. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1612(a)(2)(B)-(C) (West Supp. 1997).
28. See id. § 1612(a)(2)(A).
29. See Balanced Budget Act, § 5302(a) (amending 8 U.S.C. §1612(a)(2)(A)).
30. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1612(b)(3).
31. See id. § 1612(b)(1).
32. See Balanced Budget Act, § 5305(b) (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1612(b)(2)); seealsoKilbom, supra
note 23 (noting "the restoration of Medicaid for legal immigrants" under the Balanced Budget Act).
33. See 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1612(b)(2)(B)(i)-(ii), (b)(2)(C)(i)-(iii).
34. See id. § 1612(b)(2)(A)(i)-(ii).




The Balanced Budget.Act did not affect the PRA's remaining provisions,
which include federal means-tested public benefits, and state benefits. Qualified
aliens who enter the United States on or after August 22, 1996, are ineligible
for federal means-tested public benefits for a period of five years after entry
into the United States.36 As with earlier provisions, the PRA makes exceptions
for certain groups of aliens. The five-year period of limited eligibility does not
apply to those who fall within the political status and military exceptions.
37
The PRA gives states the authority to determine the eligibility of qualified
aliens for state public benefits.3" Regardless of a state's determination,
however, the PRA stipulates that those who fall within the political status
exception shall remain eligible for five years. 39 Those who fall within the
qualifying quarters and military exceptions retain their eligibility indefinite-
y.40 The PRA also blocks states from providing state benefits to certain
groups of aliens: those who are not qualified aliens, those who are non-
immigrants under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), and those who
are paroled in the United States under the INA for less than one year.4
Significantly, states can circumvent these restrictions by enacting a state law
after August 22, 1996, that provides eligibility for illegal aliens.42
Besides being eligible for state benefits in states that have enacted special
legislation, illegal aliens are also eligible for emergency federal and state
services. Among the federal means-tested emergency programs are medical
assistance for emergency conditions, short-term, non-cash, in-kind emergency
disaster relief, assistance under the National School Lunch Act and the Child
Nutrition Act of 1966, immunizations, and various education programs.43
State emergency programs include, but are not limited to, emergency medical
assistance, short-term, non-cash, in-kind emergency disaster relief, public
assistance for immunizations, and treatment of communicable diseases.'
B. Federal Denial of Federal Benefits
The provisions of the PRA regarding the "specified federal programs," SSI
and food stamps, raise the question of whether the federal government may
deny federal benefits to some legal permanent residents but not to others.
Although the Balanced Budget Act restores. some SSI benefits, 45 exclusions
36. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1613(a).
37. See id. §§ 1613(b)(1)(A)-(C), (b)C2)(A)-(C).
38. See id. § 1622(a).
39. See id. § 1622(b)(1)(A)-(C).
40. See id. §§ 1622(b)(2)(A)-(B), (b)(3)(A)-(C).
41. See id. § 1621(a)(i)-(3).
42. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1621(d).
43. See id. § 1613(c)(2)(A)-(K).
44. See id. § 1621(b)(i)-(4).
45. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
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remain. Qualified aliens who were not lawfully residing in the United States
prior to the enactment of the PRA will not be eligible for SSI benefits of any
kind, and even those who were lawfully residing in the United States at that
time will not be eligible for SSI assistance to the elderly unless they were
already receiving such benefits prior to the PRA's enactment. Finally, no
qualified aliens will be eligible for food stamps, regardless of when they
became lawful residents.
Indeed, the grave effects of these provisions are now being felt throughout
the country as states face the task of meeting the needs of those losing food
stamps.' Three-fourths of the country's immigrant population currently live
in four states-California, New York, Florida, and Texas.47 Of these four,
only Texas has not taken any measures to ameliorate the effects of the federal
denial of food stamps.4" However, states that are taking action are providing
only a partial replacement of the federal program.49 Charitable organizations
report that they will have difficulty picking up the slack.50 In addition, the
changes are affecting private businesses as former food stamp recipients are
reducing their spending. The repercussions are evident in supermarkets as well
46. See Controversial Provisions, supra note 22, at 1134. The cut-off of food stamps is perhaps the
most significant spending reduction to come out of the PRA to date. See Shelby Grad et al., O.C.
Merchants Fear Effects of Cutback in Food Stamps Welfare, L.A. TIMEs, Sept. 1, 1997, at Al,
available in 1997 WL 2243182.
47. See After US Cuts, States Feeding Immigrants, BosTON GLOBE, Aug. 26, 1997, at A7,
available in 1997 WL 6266947; Michelle Mittelstadt, Faced with Federal Wefare Cuts That Have,
ASSOC. PRESS POL. SERV., available in 1997 WL 2544472; Welfare Reform and Immigrants (Morning
Edition radio broadcast, Aug. 22, 1997), available in 1997WL 12822651; cf Melissa Healy, Immigrant
Advocates to Test Clout Politics, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 1, 1997, at A8, available in 1997 WL 2243166
("Nearly half of those losing food stamps live in California.").
48. See After US Cuts, supra note 47; Maria F. Durand, Groups To March in Support of Food
Stamps for Immigrants, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEws, Aug. 28, 1997, at 3B, available in 1997 WL
13202221; Mittelstadt, supra note 47.
49. Using state funds, California has replaced food stamp benefits for three years to legal
immigrants who are eighteen or younger, or sixty-five and older. See Grad et al., supra note 46; Patrick
J. McDonnell, Number Losing Aid is Disputed, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 1, 1997, at B3, available in 1997
WL 2243203; Leonel Sanchez, Legal Immigrants in County Face a Month Without Food Stamps, SAN
DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Aug. 31, 1997, at B2, available in 1997 WL 3152052. New York appears
likely to continue to provide state-funded food stamps for legal immigrants who are children, elderly,
or disabled. See Richard P6rez-Pefia, Leaders Near Budget Accord on FoodAid, N.Y. TIMES, July 24,
1997, at BI. Other states are also taking steps to provide partial replacements of federal food stamps.
See, e.g., Jennifer Preston, Whitman OrderAllows Some Legal Immigrants toRetain Food Stamps, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 27, 1997, at B5 (describing a New Jersey executive order that will replace food stamp
benefits for legal immigrants who are children, elderly, or disabled); Herbert A. Sample, Activists Want
Food Stamps Restored to Immigrants, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Aug. 22, 1997, at A15, available in 1997
WL 7439419 ("Maryland will limit the benefits to minors; and Massachusetts will grant eligibility to
all legal immigrants but at a reduced aid level.").
50. See After US Cuts, supra note 47; Grad et al., supra note 46; Patrick J. McDonnell, Food
Stamp Cutoff Will Test Charities, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 1, 1997, at Bi, available in 1997 WL 2243135;
Mittelstadt, supra note 47; Cassandra Sweet, Immigrants Lose Food Stamps; Soup Kitchens Wince,
ASSOCIATED PRESS POL. SERV., Sept. 1, 1997, available in 1997 WL 2546711; Robert E. Thomason,
Heeding the Cry; As Welfare Rolls Decline, Church Charities Are Answering More Pleas from Area's
Poor, WASH. POST, Aug. 23, 1997, at B6, available in 1997 WL 12882742.
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as in other businesses in immigrant communities.5
Despite the gravity of the effects of denying federal benefits, these
provisions of the PRA are likely to be held constitutional. Because the federal
government has sole responsibility over immigration policy,52 the courts have
treated discrimination on the basis of alienage as justifiable when carried out
by the federal government. The clearest example of this distinction arose in the
Supreme Court's 1976 decision in Mathews v. Diaz.53 The Mathews Court
considered a challenge under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
to a federal statute that limited enrollment in the Medicare supplemental
medical insurance program to legal aliens over sixty-five who both had been
admitted for permanent residence and had resided in the United States for at
least five years."4 In upholding the provision, the Court asserted that although
all immigrants, including those whose presence is not legal,55 "are protected
by the Due Process Clause," that "does not lead to the further conclusion that
all aliens are entitled to enjoy all the advantages of citizenship." 56 Although
the Court did not specify one of the traditional equal protection standards of
review, it applied a much more deferential standard to reviewing the statute in
question than it would to a state statute that made the same distinction. The
Court explained that "a division by a State of the category of persons who are
not citizens of that State into subcategories of United States citizens and aliens
has no apparent justification, whereas, a comparable classification by the
federal government is a routine and normally legitimate part of its busi-
ness."' With regard to benefits, the Court concluded that "it is unquestion-
ably reasonable for Congress to make an alien's eligibility depend on both the
character and duration of his residence."5 8 The Court, therefore, found that
discrimination against noncitizens is rational when carried out by the federal
government and requires virtually no justification.
Although the PRA involves programs other than Medicare, the program
examined in Mathews, a recent case in the Southern District of New York
51. See Grad et al., supra note 46; K. Oanh Ha, For Businesses Catering to People on Welfare,
Cutbacks Hit Hard, WALLST. J./CAL., Aug. 13,1997, at CA2, available in 1997 WL 2431250; Patrick
J. McDonnell, Community Grocers Fear Impact of Food Stamp Cuts Aid, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 1, 1997,
at Al, available in 1997 WL 2243143; Joe Sexton, Merchants with Stubborn Hopes, N.Y. TIMEs, July
19, 1997, § 1, at 21.
52. See U.S. CONsr., art. I, § 8 ("The Congress shall have Power To ... establish an uniform
Rule of Naturalization .... ."); see also Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976) ("For reasons long
recognized as valid, the responsibility for regulating the relationship between the United States and our
alien visitors has been committed to the political branches of the Federal Government.").
53. 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
54. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395(o)(2)(B) (1992). In Mathews, appellees Diaz and Clara met neither of
the two requirements. Appellee Espinosa had been lawfully admitted for permanent residence but did
not meet the five-year residency requirement. See Mathews, 426 U.S. at 69-70.
55. See Mathews, 426 U.S. at 77.
56. Id. at 78.
57. Id. at 85.
58. Id. at 82-83.
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illustrates that courts will likely apply the Mathews analysis to the PRA.59
Prior to the passage of the Balanced Budget Act, the court in Abreu v.
Callahan'° considered a constitutional challenge to the PRA provisions
denying SSI and food stamps to aliens who were already legal residents on the
date that the PRA became law.6' The court found that the applicable precedent
was Mathews v. Diaz. Drawing an analogy to the provisions tested in Mathews,
the court reasoned, "[L]ike Section 402 of the Welfare Reform Act, [the statute
at issue in Mathews] classified aliens into two groups-one eligible for a federal
benefit program and one not."62 The Abreu court, relying on the govern-
ment's oral argument, found that "there is no substantive difference between
[the standard applied in Mathews] and conventional rational basis review."6
Accordingly, the Abreu court applied rational basis analysis to the provisions
of the PRA.
The Abreu court then analyzed each of four potential government purposes
for the statute:
(1) giving aliens an incentive to become naturalized United States citizens; (2)
encouraging non-citizens to be self-sufficient and to rely on families, sponsors, and
private agencies; (3) controlling the escalating cost of the SSI program; and (4)
diminishing the incentive for inunigration created by the possible availability of
benefits.'
Each of the four purposes were found to be legitimate under rational basis
59. For an argument thatMathews might be limited to the specific requirement at issue in that case,
see Jeffrey A. Needelman, Note, Attacking Federal Restrictions on Noncitizens 'Access to PublicBenefits
on Constitutional Grounds:A Survey of RelevantDoctrines, 11 GEo. IMMIGR. L.J. 349, 359-62 (1997).
For a discussion of issues suggesting that Mathews "should not continue to guide the Court's approach
to public benefits for legal immigrants," see Recent Legislation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1191, 1194-95
(1997).
60. 971 F. Supp. 799 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
61. The case specifically does not consider the constitutionality of the PRA with regard to aliens
"who enter or become permanent residents of the United States on or after August 22, 1996." Id. at
803.
62. Id. at 807.
63. Id. at 809.
64. See id. at 815. The Abreu court explained that "rational basis review is not demanding." Id.
The court explained the standard as follows:
[A] classification neither involving fundamental rights nor proceeding along suspect lines is
accorded a strong presumption of validity. Such a classification cannot run afoul of the Equal
Protection Clause if there is a rational relationship between the disparity of treatment and some
legitimate governmental purpose. Further, a legislature that creates these categories need not
actually articulate at any time the purpose or rationale supporting its classification. Instead a
classification must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably
conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.
Id. (quoting Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312 (1993) (internal quotations and citations omitted)). The Abreu
court further found that rational basis review "is the same in the context of immigration or alienage
legislation." Id. For an argument that a stronger level of review is appropriate, see Needelman, supra
note 59, at 362-65.
65. Abreu, 971 F. Supp. at 815.
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review.66 On these grounds, the court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims that the
PRA is unconstitutional.
The Abreu decision is now moot with regard to most provisions of SSI. The
Balanced Budget Act has restored most SSI benefits to those who were the
plaintiffs in Abreu, immigrants who had established legal residency prior to the
PRA's enactment. 67 However, the decision still applies to those individuals
with regard to food stamps and also to those who would have become eligible
for elderly benefits after enactment. Although Abreu considered only those who
were legal residents before the PRA's enactment, courts are likely to apply the
same reasoning to all qualified aliens. Mathews is still the relevant standard;
rational basis review is still likely to apply, and the same four purposes are
likely to be upheld. Thus, all the provisions regarding specified federal
programs are likely to be held constitutional.
-Suzanne M. Boyce
C. State Denial of Benefits
The PRA grants states full discretion to determine the eligibility of most
noncitizens for federal TANF, Social Services Block Grant, and Medicaid
benefits, as well as state public assistance benefits.6" An exercise of this
discretionary authority, whereby a state denies benefits to legally present
noncitizens, raises two key constitutional questions. First, does a state violate
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if it denies, with
federal authorization, eligibility for public benefits to a class of noncitizens?
Second, if a state exercises its discretionary authority over benefit eligibility,
does it impermissibly encroach on exclusive federal authority over immigra-
tion?
Absent specific federal authorization, the Supreme Court has not permitted
states to tie benefit eligibility to citizenship. More than twenty-five years ago
in Graham v. Richardson,69 the Court considered challenges to two states'
welfare laws that distinguished between citizens and noncitizens for the purpose
66. Id. at 816-19. For an argument that the PRA provisions fail rational basis review, see
Needelman, supra note 59, at 365-67.
67. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
68. See discussion supra Section L.A.; 8 U.S.C.A. § 1612(b)(1) (West Supp. 1997). The PRA
prohibits states from making those who fall under the qualifying quarters exception category, the
military exception category, and, for several years, the political exception category, ineligible for the
designated federal programs. See 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1612(b)(2)(A)(i)-(il), (B)(i)-(ii), (C)(i)-(ii). In addition,
under the Balanced Budget Act, states must apply the same eligibility criteria for Medicaid to qualified
aliens as they do to citizens. See supra text accompanying note 31. The PRA also forbids states from
providing state benefits to illegal immigrants unless the state legislature enacts authorizing legislation
after the passage of the PRA, requires states to grant eligibility to those who fall under the qualifying
quarters or military exceptions, and requires states to grant eligibility for five years to those who fall
under the political status exception. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1622(b).
69. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
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of distributing public assistance benefits. An Arizona law required noncitizens
to have resided in the United States for at least fifteen years in order to be
eligible for federal benefits administered by the state." A Pennsylvania law
denied state benefits to noncitizens regardless of the duration of their
residence." The Graham Court identified noncitizens as a "'discrete and
insular' minority" deserving heightened judicial protection;' consequently,
the Court applied the most stringent form of equal protection review-strict
scrutiny-requiring provisions to be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
governmental interest.' Rejecting the states' claim of a compelling govern-
ment interest in preserving limited welfare benefits for state citizens, the Court
noted the particularly noxious quality of excluding from public benefit
programs noncitizens who pay taxes and otherwise contribute to economic
growth.74 The Court concluded that the classifications based on alienage were
unjustified and thus struck down both state laws as violations of the Equal
Protection Clause.7'
Yet Graham does not necessarily extend to instances, like those that may
spring from the PRA, in which state discrimination based on alienage is
federally authorized. The success of an equal protection challenge to a state
denial of benefit eligibility authorized by the PRA would depend on whether
the courts treat such a state policy more like a state denial of benefits, which
is impermissible under Graham,76 or more like a federal denial of benefits,
which is permissible under Mathews.' Although the Supreme Court has not
considered federally authorized state benefit denials, the Ninth Circuit rejected
the argument that state eligibility requirements for welfare benefits should
receive strict scrutiny as state classifications based on alienage even when they
are consistent with federal welfare criteria.7" Yet the Graham Court specifical-
ly noted that if federal legislation "were to be read so as to authorize
70. See id. at 367.
71. See id. at 368.
72. Id. at 372 (quoting United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938)).
73. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217 (1982); Graham, 403 U.S. at 376.
74. See Graham, 403 U.S. at 374, 376. The Court remained silent on whether the state laws were
narrowly tailored.
75. See id. Eleven years later in Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. at 202, the Court rejected the notion that
illegal immigrants constitute a suspect class warranting strict judicial scrutiny. See id. at 219-20, 220
n.19. Although the Plyler Court ultimately prohibited the state of Texas from banning undocumented
children from attending public schools, the decision was based largely on the conclusion that children
are not responsible for their illegal status. See id. at 220, 223. With regard to legal immigrants,
however, Graham's bar against state classification based on alienage is still the law.
76. 403 U.S. at 365.
77. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
78. See Sudomir v. McMahon, 767 F.2d 1456, 1466 (9th Cir. 1985) ("It would make no sense to
say that Congress has plenary power in the area of immigration and naturalization and then hold that
the Constitution impels the states to refrain from adhering to the federal guidelines. The district court
correctly applied the relaxed scrutiny standard to the law in upholding the denial of benefits to asylum
applicants."); see also discussion supra Section I.B.
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discriminatory treatment of aliens at the option of the States . . . serious
constitutional questions are presented .... Congress does not have the power
to authorize the individual States to violate the Equal Protection Clause." 79
Graham thus suggests that states may violate the Equal Protection Clause even
when acting with explicit federal authorization. Moreover, Graham implies that
Congress may exceed its constitutional authority by explicitly permitting states
to determine noncitizens' eligibility for benefits. Whether the PRAs delegation
of discretionary authority violates the Equal Protection Clause, regardless of
whether states choose to deny public benefits to noncitizens, will be addressed
in the next section."
In addition to equal protection challenges, state discretion over noncitizen
eligibility for benefits might be challenged as intruding on federal jurisdiction
over immigration policy."1 The Graham Court struck down the challenged
state laws not only on equal protection grounds, but also because immigration
policy is "constitutionally entrusted to the Federal Government."8 However,
in light of the PR~s authorization of state eligibility determination, a court
might now find a state denial of public benefits to noncitizens constitutionally
permissible as a matter of federal immigration policy.
Whether state determination of eligibility for public benefits constitutes
immigration policy was considered recently when California attempted to
restrict benefits to noncitizens.' Proposition 187, a ballot initiative enacted
by popular vote, requires state personnel to deny social services, health care,
and education to all illegal immigrants.8' The challenge and decision did not
consider whether the initiative violates the Equal Protection Clause,s but
rather evaluated its provisions from an immigration standpoint. Specifically, the
court examined whether the federal government's exclusive authority to
regulate immigration preempted the initiative.86
A federal district court held that the initiative's provisions denying federal
public benefits to illegal immigrants were preempted only when they created
79. Graham, 403 U.S. at 382.
80. See discussion infra Section I.D.; see also Recent Legislation, supra note 58, at 1193.
81. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4, art. I, § 2, cl. 2.
82. Graham, 403 U.S. at 378.
83. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755 (C.D. Cal.), appeal
docketed, (WL DCt. DN(SDCA) 97-0965-R) (9th Cir. 1995).
84. The initiative also requires state employees to verify the immigration status of every person with
whom they come into contact, notify those suspected of residing in the country illegally of their status,
and report those individuals to immigration officials. See id. at 763.
85. In a 1996 case, a California Court of Appeals rejected a claim that a state policy of denying
General Assistance benefits to noncitizens with pending applications for political asylum violates the
Equal Protection Clause because such noncitizens are not "lawfully resident" in the county. See
Khasminskaya v. Lum, 47 Cal. App. 537, 545 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) ("[Equal protection principles do
not require that all aliens be treated alike, when they are not similarly situated for purposes of federal
immigration law. It is constitutionally valid to distinguish among aliens and grant benefits to some who
have a lawful residence status, but not to all aliens, however transient, impermanent, or unlawful.").
86. See League of Latin Am. Citizens, 908 F. Supp. at 764.
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an obstacle to the accomplishment of congressional objectives.' In other
words, state denials of federal benefits were deemed permissible except where
federal law specifically authorized eligibility regardless of immigration
status.8 Although the court did not consider federal programs that distinguish
among different categories of legal immigrants, the opinion clearly states that
when Congress has conditioned eligibility for federal benefits on lawful
immigration status, a state denial of public benefits to illegal immigrants would
not be preempted.89
Although the court declined to decide whether states could deny state
benefits on the basis of alienage, 9 its opinion suggests that such a denial
would be preempted only if it were to conflict directly with federal law.9'
Because the PRA explicitly allows states to determine eligibility for state
benefits, state legislation restricting noncitizens' eligibility would not conflict
with federal law and thus presumably would not be preempted under the
reasoning applied by the district court in the Proposition 187 case.
Immigration law challenges to state policies denying public benefits to
certain noncitizens are unlikely to be successful in the wake of the challenge
to Proposition 187 unless higher courts apply different reasoning. Equal
protection claims that draw on Graham's analysis are more viable, but still far
from guaranteed in light of the entirely new context of federal authorization.
Given the uncertainty of a federal constitutional claim, violation of state
constitutional or statutory provisions might offer the strongest legal option for
those seeking to challenge state benefit denials based on alienage. Ironically,
however, such advocates face a strategic dilemma. 92 Because states now have
discretion over designated federal as well as state public benefits, litigants
challenging partial eligibility denials might lead state legislators to attempt to
"solve the problem" by eliminating discretionary benefits for noncitizens
87. The Court in De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976), established three tests to determine
whether a state provision is preempted by federal law. A state law is preempted if: it "regulate[s]
immigration," id. at 354, Congress demonstrates a clear intent to effect a "complete ouster of state
power" in the field addressed by the statute, id. at 357, or the statute frustrates congressional goals, see
id. at 363. In examining the initiative's provisions denying public benefits to illegal immigrants, the
district court in League of Latin Am. Citizens concluded that such a denial does not constitute a
regulation of immigration. See League of Latin Am. Citizens, 908 F. Supp. at 768-75. Furthermore,
based on the legislative history of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1525, the
court held that Congress had not ousted state authority to regulate in the field of public benefits. See id.
at 775-76. In light of the PRA's explicit granting of state authority to determine eligibility for certain
groups of legal immigrants, it is even less likely now that a court would consider state power ousted in
the field of public benefits and strike down state legislation as preempted on those grounds.
88. See League of Latin Am. Citizens, 908 F. Supp. at 781-82.
89. See id. at 779.
90. The court was not convinced that wholly state-funded benefit programs actually existed. See
id. at 780-82, 787.
91. See id.
92. Interview with Michael Wishnie, StaffAttorney at the American Civil Liberties Union, in New
Haven, Conn. (Oct. 6, 1997).
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altogether. Local attorneys may decide that the potential gains are not worth
the risks involved in challenging states. As a result, challenges to provisions
of the PRA itself that authorize state discretion, explored further in the
following section, may offer a less risky alternative for advocates. 3
D. Federal Authorization of State Discretion
The PRA authorizes states to determine the eligibility of most noncitizens
for state public assistance benefits and certain federal benefits.' Such broad
state authority raises another constitutional question. Does Congress impermis-
sibly delegate federal authority over immigration if it grants discretion
regarding noncitizens' benefit eligibility to the states?
There are two main avenues of challenge to the federal authorization of
state discretion regarding benefit eligibility. The first approach entails arguing
that equal protection doctrine requires the same degree of protection from
federal classification by alienage as it does from state classification by
alienage.1 This argument necessitates distinguishing welfare policy from
immigration policy. The second option entails treating the PRA as though it
were immigration law and challenging the delegation of federal authority as
violating either the nondelegation doctrine or the constitutional requirement that
Congress establish a uniform rule of naturalization. 6
In recent years the Supreme Court has come to accept the premise that "the
reach of the equal protection guarantee of the Fifth Amendment is coextensive
with that of the Fourteenth."' Equal protection challenges to the PRs
authorization of state discretion would rely on the inconsistent results that arise
from Graham's5 holding that state denial of benefits violates the equal
protection of the laws accorded to noncitizens and Mathews'" holding that
federal denial of benefits to noncitizens does not. From the perspective of an
individual, it makes little difference whether it is the state government or
federal legislation denying needed benefits.
The Supreme Court has addressed the possibility of Congress eroding state
equal protection guarantees. In response to a suggestion in the dissent in
Katzenbach v. Morgan1" that the Court's opinion would extend to Congress
93. Challenges to the PRA raise a similar strategic dilemma in that there is always the possibility
that Congress will respond by scaling back benefits.
94. See 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1612(b), 1622(b) (West Supp. 1997); Balanced Budget Act, Pub. L. No.
105-33, 111 Stat. 251 (1997); see also discussions supra Section L.A, note 67 and accompanying text.
95. See Recent Legislation, supra note 58, at 1194-95.
96. See Needelman, supra note 58, at 373-83.
97. United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 166 n.16 (1987).
98. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971).
99. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 85 (1976).
100. 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (rejecting a 1966 challenge to § 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965,
42 U.S.C. § 1973b(e) (Supp. I 1964), that prevented enforcement of pre-existing state election law
requiring English literacy as condition of voting).
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the discretion to dilute prior equal protection decisions,101 the majority
clarified that Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment "grants Congress no
power to restrict, abrogate, or dilute" the Amendment's equal protection and
due process guarantees.'"u In conducting its equal protection inquiry the
Graham Court explicitly applied strict scrutiny and justified its selection of the
most rigorous standard of review by characterizing alienage as a generally
impermissible classification. 3 Because Graham makes clear that state denials
of benefits violate the equal protection afforded to noncitizens, Congressional
authorization of state denials of benefits, although not enacted under Section
Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, certainly appears to restrict, abrogate, and
dilute an equal protection guarantee in a manner proscribed by Morgan.'
The Mathews Court, even though it did not clearly articulate a level of
scrutiny, applied an analysis more deferential to the political branches of
government than did the Graham Court, with no mention of Morgan;"'5
consequently, the level of protection afforded noncitizens from state action
differs from that provided to noncitizens from federal endeavors. This
discrepancy runs counter to the doctrine that the Equal Protection Clause
should apply to the federal government in the same way that it applies to the
states. 0 6
In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,"'7 however, the Supreme Court
specifically pointed to alienage as an exception to the general rule that the
Equal Protection Clause should apply to the federal government just as it
applies to the states. The Court justified the special treatment of alienage as
warranted by deference due to the political branches in determining immigra-
101. See id. at 668 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
102. See Morgan, 384 U.S. at 651 n.10. The Court has also rejected the argument that state
regulation authorized by federal legislation pursuant to the Commerce Clause is exempt from rational
review under the Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 880
(1985).
103. See discussion supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
104. The Ninth Circuit rejected the argument that the federal policy of denying AFDC benefits to
noncitizens with pending asylum applications is unconstitutional because it authorizes states to treat one
category of noncitizens differently from another, an action that would violate the Equal Protection
Clause if carried out by a state alone. See Sudomir v. McMahon, 767 F.2d 1456, 1466-67 (9th Cir.
1985) ("Mhe classification Congress has created is valid because of its plenary power over
immigration. Moreover, Congress has enacted a uniform policy regarding the eligibility of asylum
applicants for welfare benefits. This makes inapplicable the suggestion in Graham v. Richardson that
Shapiro may require the invalidation of congressional enactments permitting states to adopt divergent
laws regarding the eligibility of aliens for federally supported welfare programs.") (citation omitted).
105. See discussion supra note 56 and accompanying text.
106. The idea that the same equal protection standards should apply to the federal government as
to the states was first articulated with regard to race in a school desegregation case, but has since been
extended to sex and equal protection claims more generally. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93
(1976); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 681 n.5 (1973); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499
(1954); see also Recent Legislation, supra note 58, at 1194-95.
107. 515 U.S. 200, 217-18 (1995).
Vol. 16:221, 1997
Developments in Policy
tion policy." 8 In keeping with this exception, the courts might view authori-
zation of state discretion over benefit eligibility as a matter of federal immigra-
tion policy determined by the political branches and therefore subject to
deference. ' 9
One argument that might overcome the alienage exception is that the PRA
does not determine immigration policy, but rather welfare policy."0 Because
the impetus for deference with regard to immigration is its close relationship
to foreign policy, domestic welfare policy may be subject to more rigorous
judicial scrutiny."' Ironically, the Proposition 187 decision supports this
argument because the district court concluded that state restrictions on state
benefits do not constitute a regulation of immigration."' Although the PRA
does not pose an identical question because it involves federal authorizing
legislation, the notion that state determination of benefit eligibility is not
immigration policy may still apply. Nonetheless, because the Supreme Court
failed to recognize a distinction between welfare policy and immigration policy
in Mathews,"' an equal protection claim based on distinguishing between the
two fields is unlikely to succeed.
If instead, the courts deem welfare eligibility an aspect of immigration
policy, federal authorization of state discretion could be challenged as a
violation of Congress' constitutional authority to delegate its responsibilities,
or alternatively as a violation of the Naturalization Clause of the Constitu-
tion." 4 The Supreme Court adheres loosely to the non-delegation doctrine
that "Congress generally cannot delegate its legislative power to another
branch."" 5 Increasingly, however, the Court permits Congress to obtain
108. See id.
109. See discussion supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
110. See Recent Legislation, supra note 58, at 1195-96.
111. This argument was raised in a recent challenge to the PRA's provisions denying food stamps
and SSI benefits to certain legal permanent residents. The City of Chicago argued that since the PRA
bears only a tangential relationship to immigration or naturalization policy and denies critical
subsistence-level benefits, the court should apply an intermediate level of scrutiny when evaluating its
equal protection challenges. Such scrutiny would require the federal government to demonstrate that the
provisions are substantially related to an important federal interest. As of November 14, 1997, no
opinion had been issued in the case. See Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary
Injunction at 12-13, City of Chicago v. Shalala, No. 97 C 4884 (N.D. Ill. filed July 10, 1997).
112. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 770-71 (C.D. Cal.
1995); discussion supra note 86.
113. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
114. The City of Chicago raised both arguments in a Complaint challenging the PRA's provisions
denying Food Stamps and SSI benefits to certain legal permanent residents. See Complaint at 3, 15, City
of Chicago v. Shalala, No. 97 C 4884 (N.D. Ill. E. Div. filed July 10, 1997). The City of Chicago did
not, however, pursue these claims in its Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary
Injunction. As of November 14, 1997, no opinion had been issued in the case. See Memorandum in
Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction, City of Chicago v. Shalala, No. 97 C 4884
(N.D. Ill. E. Div. filed July 10, 1997).
115. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) (quoting Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649,
692 (1892)). The non-delegation doctrine became associated with attempts to prevent New Deal
delegations of regulatory authority to the executive branch and was largely abandoned along with the
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assistance from other branches of government so long as it provides an
"intelligible principle" to guide the agency receiving authority.1 6 The PRA
does not offer such a guiding principle. In fact, it sends conflicting messages.
While the PRA declares that states have a compelling interest in denying
benefits to non-citizens to encourage self-sufficiency, it permits states to offer
federal benefits anyway." 7 Ironically, a complete federal denial of benefits
would be more likely to withstand judicial scrutiny. Therefore, arguing that the
PRA lacks an intelligible principle might undermine access to benefits by
prompting a decision to prohibit all benefits to non-citizens.
The delegation of authority to the states might be challenged on grounds of
institutional competence and political accountability. 118 The argument would
be that because the states are not accountable for foreign policy, they are not
appropriate guardians of authority over immigration policy. The Supreme
Court has already prohibited delegation to an executive agency of the authority
to consider alienage in hiring decisions, even though such a- classification
would be permissible if made by the President or Congress." 9 Following this
line of reasoning, even if the federal government may consider alienage when
defining benefit eligibility, the Court might not find that Congress is
constitutionally authorized to delegate this discretion to the states. 20
Immigration law provides an alternative claim resting on the Naturalization
Clause, which requires that Congress "establish an uniform Rule of Naturaliza-
tion."12' Such a challenge would assert that by authorizing the states to
determine eligibility criteria, Congress has virtually assured that there will be
no uniform policy regarding whether noncitizens may receive certain federal
benefits." In fact, the Graham Court went so far as to declare that "[a]
Lochner-era judicial approach. Yet Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist have advocated reviving
the doctrine to prevent Congress from delegating policy decisions specifically in order to avoid political
accountability. For a detailed discussion of the history and applicability of the non-delegation doctrine,
see Needelman, supra note 58, at 373-83.
116. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372 (quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S.
394, 406 (1928)).
117. The internal inconsistency may reflect a political compromise. The original U.S. House
version of the PRA prohibited Medicaid eligibility for noncitizens, whereas the U.S. Senate version
allowed eligibility. When conferees were unable to reach a consensus on the Medicaid question, they
compromised on a policy of state discretion. Such a devolution of politically controversial decision-
making is exactly the scenario that advocates of the nondelegation doctrine seek to preclude. See
Needelman, supra note 59, at 373-83; see also discussion supra note 113.
118. See Hiroshi Motomura, Whose Immigration Law?: Citizens, Aliens, and the Constitution, 97
COLUM. L. REv. 1567, 1600 n.103 (1997) (book review).
119. See Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
120. However, inPlylerv. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,219 (1982), the Court implied that delegation might
be permissible: "[I]f the Federal Government has by uniform rule prescribed what it believes to be
appropriate standards for the treatment of an alien subclass, the States may, of course, follow the federal
direction." Id. at 219 n.19.
121. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.




congressional enactment construed so as to permit state legislatures to adopt
divergent laws on the subject of citizenship requirements for federally
supported welfare programs would appear to contravene this explicit
constitutional requirement of uniformity."" Graham is consistent with the
way the Court has treated the uniformity requirement with regard to taxa-
tion.'24 In that context the Court has interpreted uniformity to mean geo-
graphic uniformity.'" A uniform rule, however, may be construed to mean
only uniform federal incorporation of divergent state rules. The Court has
interpreted the uniformity requirement in this manner in the context of
bankruptcy." The question for the courts would be whether the Naturaliza-
tion Clause requires geographic uniformity, not guaranteed by the PRA, or
merely federal incorporation of state rules, which the PRA constitutes.
The Supreme Court has never clarified the nature of the uniformity
required by the Naturalization Clause, but a few appellate courts have
construed the clause as requiring geographic uniformity.27 These cases
suggest that a rule is uniform if it operates differently in each state due to
variations in circumstances," but they do not resolve whether a rule is
uniform if it operates differently in each state due to variations in state
law. 29 Moreover, despite the suggestion in Graham,3' the Supreme Court
has not determined definitively whether the uniformity requirement of the
Naturalization Clause even extends to immigration policy or public bene-
123. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 382 (1971).
124. The Constitution requires uniformity with regard to naturalization, taxation, and bankruptcy.
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 4.
125. See, e.g., Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41 (1900).
126. See, e.g., Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 190 (1902).
127. See, e.g., Kharaiti Ram Samras v. United States, 125 F.2d 879, 881 (9th Cir. 1942)
("Regarding the provision in the Constitution empowering Congress to establish a 'uniform' rule of
naturalization, we think the restriction of uniformity relates to geography only" and does not invalidate
a federal statute that extended naturalization rights only to certain racial groups.).
128. See, e.g., Darling v. Berry, 13 F. 659, 667-68 (D. Iowa 1882) ("[W]hen a bankrupt, revenue,
or naturalization law is made by its terms applicable alike to all the states of the Union, without
distinction or discrimination, it cannot be successfully questioned on the ground that it is not uniform,
in the sense of the constitution, merely because its operation or working may be wholly different in one
state from another.... The law must be general and uniform in its provisions but its working and
operation may be very different in different states, owing to their diverse conditions and circumstanc-
es.").
129. See, e.g., Moon Ho Kim v. INS, 514 F.2d 179, 180-81 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (rejecting the
argument that recourse to state law meets the uniformity requirement); Petition of Schroers, 336 F.
Supp. 1348 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (preferring a uniform federal standard for citizenship to "patchwork
standards of each state"). But see, e.g., Brea-Garcia v. INS, 531 F.2d 693, 697-98 (3d Cir. 1976)
(rejecting Moon Ho Kim's interpretation of uniformity requirement in favor of recourse to state laws
when community standards are more appropriate than national standards); Petition of Lee Wee, 143 F.
Supp. 736, 738 (S.D. Cal. 1956) (holding naturalization requirement of fewer than two gambling
convictions to be constitutional because it is "uniformly of geographic applicability" even though
gambling convictions depend on varying state laws).
130. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 382 (1971).
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fits.' Nonetheless, outside the context of interpreting the Naturalization
Clause, the Court has emphasized the importance of ensuring that lawfully
admitted immigrants receive equal hospitality throughout the states."
Therefore, one could argue that the geographic uniformity requirement should
apply to public benefits. Regardless, federal authorization of state discretion
renders it easier for the courts to interpret the PRA as fulfiling the uniformity
requirement even though noncitizens' eligibility for public benefits may vary
by state.
In conclusion, challenges to congressional authorization of state discretion
to determine noncitizens' benefit eligibility are among the most unique legal
claims that may be raised by the PRA. Distinguishing welfare from immigra-
tion policy, the argument that federal equal protection should be coextensive
with state equal protection is unlikely to be accepted by the courts in light of
Mathews.' However, the charge that Congress has exceeded its authority
to delegate responsibility, both because it has failed to provide a guiding
principle and because the states are ill-suited to make eligibility determinations
that bear on immigration policy, is credible and has a sound precedential basis.
The question of whether state discretion is consistent with a uniform rule as
required by the Naturalization Clause remains to be resolved by the Supreme
Court. These potential challenges present an opportunity to forge a body of
precedent on federally authorized state discretion, which is especially pressing
at a time of increasing federal emphasis on delegating policy decisions to the
states.
-Zoo Neuberger
II. CHILDREN'S WELFARE & THE DOCTRINE OF PARENS PATMAE
The doctrine of parens patriae vests state governments with the authority
to intervene in one of the nation's innermost sanctums-the family.34
Specifically, the doctrine empowers the state to act as protector and caretaker
of its children. The passage of the PRA, however, created a wrinkle in the
131. Nor have the appellate courts made such a declaration. See Moon Ho Kim, 514 F.2d at 180
(declining to decide whether uniformity requirement of Naturalization Clause extends beyond
naturalization to immigration laws).
132. See, e.g., Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 42 (1915) ("[l]f [a state law restricting employment
of noncitizens] were permissible, the practical result would be that those lawfully admitted to the country
under the authority of the acts of Congress, instead of enjoying in a substantial sense and in their full
scope the privileges conferred by the admission, would be segregated in such of the states as chose to
offer hospitality.").
133. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
134. See Kay P. Kindred, God Bless The Child: Poor Children, Parens Patriae, and a State
Obligation To Provide Assistance, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 519, 526 (1996) ("When acting to protect the
general welfare of children, the state has wide latitude to restrict parental control. This state power,
known as the parens patriae doctrine, in essence, gives the state the authority to serve as a substitute
parent and ultimate protector of children's interests.") (citations omitted).
Vol. 16:221, 1997
Developments in Policy
legal and policy fabric of parens patriae. Notably, the PRA was the death knell
for the over half-century old program of Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC).' In place of this massive federal assistance program, the
PRA instituted a nationwide patchwork of block grant programs to be
administered with nearly complete state discretion and little federal over-
sight. 136 Through the PRA, the federal government has essentially thrust
upon the states the responsibility to end the distressing patterns of welfare
dependency and the ever-increasing disbursal of federal entitlement dollars. 137
While these may be impressive and necessary policy goals, the PRA will also
likely place over one million children in poverty.1 38 Because of the PRA-
mandated state government programs, more children will be in poverty; and
these children, thereby, may be more apt to suffer from a lack of the very
services and proper care that typically causes states to intervene in child abuse
and neglect cases.
Accordingly, this Part explores the potential tension between the new
welfare law and the doctrine of parens patriae. Section A outlines the changes
in the law that most affect the welfare of children. Section B provides a brief
explanation of the doctrine of parens patriae. Finally, Section C contemplates
the impact that the PRA will likely have on the care that children receive and
suggests that the requirements imposed by the federal law may conflict with the
states' established common law doctrine of parens patriae.
A. Changes in the Law
The PRA instituted several changes that promised to have significant effects
on child welfare throughout the United States. As discussed above, the Act
abolished individual federal entitlement for AFDC and related programs, which
previously provided cash assistance to more than 4.6 million families with
approximately 8.6 million children. 139 Under AFDC, states defined what was
considered sufficient "need" to qualify for assistance, set their own benefit
levels, and established income and resource limits. As state resources were
augmented by unlimited matching funds from the federal government,
individual applicants who met their state's need criteria were guaranteed
benefits. 140
The primary goal of AFDC was to enable single mothers to care for their
135. See Maureen Berner, Wetfare Reform: Testing theAbility ofthe Block Grant Formula to Meet
States' Need, 69 SPEcTRuM: THE J. OF ST. GOV'T 38, 38 (1996).
136. See id.
137. See Mary Jo Bane, Wetfare as We Might Know It, AM. PROSPEcr, Jan.-Feb. 1997, at 47.
138. See id. (referring to a Department of Health and Human Services estimate).
139. See MARK V. NADEL, WELFARE REFORM-IMPICATIONS OF INCREASED WORK
PARTICIPATION FOR CHILD CARE, GAO/HEHS Doe. No. 97-95 (1997) [hereinafter IMPLICATIONS].
140. See Bemer, supra note 136, at 38.
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children at home.141 Before mothers' pensions were established, most
children in orphanages or foster care were not orphans, but had living parents
who lacked jobs or access to child care. 42 AFDC was originally restricted
to widows who could provide a caseworker's vision of a "suitable home," but
expanded coverage gradually until the 1960s, when a series of court decisions
invalidated eligibility tests that had been used to deny AFDC to racial
minorities. 43 In 1988, Congress mandated that states purvey AFDC to two-
parent families.'"
The new welfare law replaces this system with block grants provided by the
federal government to states in a program called Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families ("TANF"). The TANF grants have stringent requirements,
forcing welfare parents to obtain jobs in return for their benefits. 4 A portion
of the Act, dubbed "workfare," mandates that at least twenty-five percent of
a state's welfare recipients be "engaged" in paid employment, unpaid "work
experience" or "community service" for at least twenty hours per week in
fiscal year 1997, and that fifty percent be so employed by fiscal year 2002.146
Further, seventy-five percent of two-parent households receiving assistance
must demonstrate that one parent is working at least thirty-five hours per
week. 47 All welfare families are required to comply, though states maintain
the option to exempt single parents who are caring for a child up to age
one.'48 If a welfare parent refuses to work, the family's assistance will either
be reduced in proportion to the number of work hours by which the parent falls
short, or be terminated.'49 Single parents of children under age six can avoid
reduction or termination of aid by demonstrating that "appropriate" child care
is unavailable, but the parents bear the burden of proof. Moreover, the
state-ever under pressure to meet its twenty-five percent quota-determines
what constitutes "unavailable" and "appropriate."1 50
In addition, the Act takes the harsh step of placing a five-year lifetime limit
on the receipt of welfare benefits,' 5' and permits states to shorten the limit
if they so desire. The time limit applies only to benefits received as an adult,
141. See LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT Nor ENTITLED 23, 45-46 (1994).
142. Id.
143. See Benjamin L. Weiss, Single Mothers' Equal Right To Parent: A Fourteenth Amendment
Defense Against Forced-Labor Welfare "Reform," 15 LAW & INEQ. 215, 215 n.2 (1997) (citing
FRANcEs FOX PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR 306-14 (2d ed. 1993)).
144. See id. (citing WALTER I. TRATrNER, FROM POOR LAW TO WELFARE STATE (4th ed. 1989)).
145. See PRA, Pub. L. No. 104-193, §101-103(a)(1), 110 Stat. 2110, 2112, 2115 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
146. See id. at § 103(a)(1), 110 Stat. 2129 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
147. See id.
148. PRA, § 103, 407(b)(5).
149. Id. § 103, 407(e)(2), 110 Stat. at 2133.
150. See Weiss, supra note 144, at 217 (citing PRA, § 103, 407(e)(2)).
151. PRA, § 103, 408(a)(7). 110 Stat. at 2137.
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and the state may choose to exempt a family from the limit as a result of
"hardship," or if a member has "been battered or subjected to extreme
cruelty;"152 however, such exceptions may at no time constitute more than
twenty percent of the state's aggregate caseload."' Moreover, "hardship"
itself is not defined, and the law makes no mention of who or what determines
whether an abuse claim qualifies a family for exemption.1 54
In sum, the changes that the PRA institutes require welfare parents to spend
more hours at work activities and fewer hours at home with their children. In
the breach stands a system of child care that may be inadequate in meeting
increased demands for day care (and sometimes night care) services at all, let
alone with a modicum of quality 55 and affordabilityl56 for low-income
parents. With a state demanding work hours, and a child care system possibly
unable to provide adequate care, the PRA may leave welfare parents and
children with an impossible choice: risk noncompliance and possible benefits
termination or place the children at risk in low-quality or even dangerous
caretaker arrangements. Thus, in imposing strict welfare-to-work requirements
on states and parents, while at the same time leaving states and parents little
guidance to navigate "appropriate" child care options, the PRA and TANF may
operate in contravention to states' parens patriae obligation to protect children.
B. Parens Patriae: The State as Protector of Children
Parens patriae is a common law doctrine under which the state has an
obligation to ensure the safety and well-being of children. The doctrine
originated in seventeenth-century England, 57 but has long been recognized
152. Id. § 103, 408(a)(7)(C), 110 Stat. at 2137-38.
153. See id.§ 103, 408(a)(7)(C)(ii), 110 Stat. at 2138.
154. See id.
155. Estimates of the quality of child care centers indicate that most children receive moderately
to highly substandard child care. See Inadequate Child Care Strains America's Working Families (last
modified Nov. 4, 1997) <http://www.childrensdefense.org.ccfact.html> ("Six out of seven child care
centers provide care that is mediocre to poor, according to a recent national study by a group of
universities."). One study found that one in eight child care centers could actually "jeopardize children's
safety and development." Id. (citing Helbum et al., Cost, Quality, Outcomes Study: Executive Summary
(University of Colorado, Denver)(1995)). According to another study, in-home child care may not be
the answer-one in three homes was found to be possibly harmful to children. See id. (citing Galinsky
et al., The Study of Children in Family Child Care and Relative Care: Highlights of Findings (Families
and Work Institute, New York)(1994)).
156. In major cities across the nation, average yearly child care costs for children age one to age
three would seem to occupy a large portion of a family budget based on annual income at or near
minimum wage. Collected from resource and referral agencies in several cities, statistics of cost-per-
child show the burden: Boston, Mass., $8,840; Boulder, Colo. $6,240; Dallas, Tex., $4,210; Durham,
N. C, $4,630; Oakland, Calif., $6,500; Minneapolis, Minn., $6,030. See id. (citing Child Care
Information Exchange, 1996).
157. Parenspatriae doctrine is said to have arisen from the right of the Crown to protect subjects
who were unable to protect themselves. The first reported use of the concept occurred in 1696 in
Falkland v. Bertie, 23 Eng. Rep. 814, 818 (1696), where the court held that the demise of the Court
of Wards returned the "pater patriae" responsibility of the King for the care of charities, infants, idiots,
and lunatics to the Chancery. See Kindred, supra note 134, at 519, 526 n.45. Over the years, theparens
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in the United States, where it is now governed primarily by state statutes.1'1
Literally defined as the "parent of the country," the term refers to the
traditional role of the state as sovereign and guardian of persons under legal
disability, such as juveniles or the insane, and in child custody determinations,
when acting to protect the interests of the child. Fundamentally, it is the
principle that the state must care for those who cannot take care of them-
selves.15 9 The parens patriae power essentially gives the state authority to
serve as a substitute parent and protector of children's interests; in the proper
exercise of the power, the state may require parents to provide adequate food,
clothing, shelter, and medical care for their children."e Indeed, parental
dereliction in these respects can lead to the removal of children from the
parents' care.
At a minimum, then, the doctrine can be said to obligate the state to act in
the "best interests of the child."16 Yet the new federal welfare law, in
forcing parents to abandon the close care of their children, may conflict with
states' own parens patriae obligation to protect the best interests and welfare
of children.
C. Independence or Inadequacy: The Child Care Dilemma of Welfare
Reform
The PRA sets states on an ironic path: At one turn, the states must play the
primary role in cutting the expenditures of welfare dollars to needy families;
at another turn, the states must intervene in family situations that demonstrate
abuse or neglect of children-situations in which poverty is often a major
contributing factor. With the changes in the welfare system under the PRA, the
states will require more parents to work. As more parents transition from
welfare to work, outside-the-home child care needs will likely increase. 62
patriae power was expanded to justify court interference to protect wards from the misdeeds of
testamentary guardians, see id. (citing Beaufort v. Berty, 24 Eng. Rep. 579 (1721)), and to protect a
child from exploitation by third parties, see id. (citing Butler v. Freeman, 27 Eng. Rep. 204, 204
(1756)). Precursors to the modem conception appeared in In re Spence, 41 Eng. Rep. 937, 938-39
(1847), when a court held that the state properly could intervene to protect a child from his parent or
guardian in the absence of property. See id. For a more thorough exposition of the historical evolution
ofparenspatriae, see Lawrence B. Custer, The Origins ofParens Patriae, 27 EMORY L.J. 195 (1978).
158. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16760 (West 1997); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 35-32
(West 1997); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 53A-21c (West 1997); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-14-26 (Michie
1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-916 (1953).
159. See BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990).
160. See Kindred, supra note 134, at 521.
161. The "best interest of the child" standard is the one used by state courts in determining what
course of action should be taken with respect to children. See, e.g., In re Coast, 561 A.2d 762, 782-83
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (involving parental termination); Hagins v. Hagins, 678 So.2d 479, 481 (Fla.
1996) (involving custody issues); In re Dickhaus, 371 N.E.2d. 800, 802 (Ohio 1974) (involving
adoption proceedings).
162. See Elspeth K. Deily, Working With Welfare: Can Single Mothers Manage?, 12 BERKELEY
WOMEN'S L.J. 132, 134 (1997). The Children's Defense Fund estimates that "[t]here are about 24
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The PRA has no guaranteed child care component."6 The PRA's only
guarantee is that "child care subsidies provide 'equal access' between those
families receiving child care services under the Act and those receiving similar
services in the state or geographic area.""' 4 While this requirement certainly
conforms to constitutional equal protection requirements, the PRA contains no
provision guaranteeing basic child care. This omission ignores the role that
child care plays in realizing welfare-to-work goals.16'
1. Public Assistance and Neglect
Supporting one's children in the transition from AFDC to TANF may
prove daunting for many families."6e The data simply is not available to
ascertain just how many families are unable to cope under the new TANF
program.167 The question remains, therefore, to what extent the care of
children is sacrificed as states get tougher on the poor. The late 1980s and
early 1990s saw a rise in concern over child care, evidenced by expansion of
subsidies such as the Dependent Care Tax Credit," the Head Start program
and Title XX of the Social Services Block Grant,169 the Child Care Develop-
ment Block Grant,170 and subsidies to parents through the Family Support
Act of 1988's Job Opportunities and Basic Skills (JOBS) program. 71 With
the dawn of the twenty-first century nearly upon us, questions remain-despite
the subsidy programs and tax credits-as to the ability of the State to facilitate
quality child care for low-income parents. Indeed, the provision of quality child
care may be the linchpin in the lasting success of welfare reform.
Being poor certainly significantly increases the likelihood that a child will
million children ages 5 to 14 in America with a working parent, and typically they spend less than two-
thirds of the time their parents are working in school." Marion Wright Edelman, A Voice for Children:
After-schoolActivities a Must, CDF Reports, Nov. 1997, available at http://www.childrensdefense.org/-
voice.html.
163. See, e.g., Deily, supra note 162, at 134 (describing child care law in the State of California).
164. See id. (quoting § 103, 110 Stat. at 2283 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 9858c(c)-
(4)(A))).
165. See Deily, supra note 162, at 136.
166. Bane, supra note 137, at 47 ("States that have gotten serious about work or more general
participation requirements are cutting the benefits of many, many families who are sanctioned for
noncooperation. States have also seen dramatic decreases in caseloads, not entirely driven by good
economies, from people deterred by the new requirements and the new climate.").
167. See id.
168. See Barbara Reisman, The Economics of Child Care: Its Importance in Federal Legislation,
26 HARv. I. ON LEG. 473, 501 (1989).
169. See id.
170. See NADEL, supra note 139.
171. See id.; see also Barbara B. Blum, Children and WelfareReform-Policy Point of View, CHILD
POVERTY NEWS & ISSUES, Fall 1994, <http://cpmcnet.columbia.edu/deptlnccp >. The PRA subsumed
the JOBS program under the umbrella of the Child Care Development Block Grant (CCDBG). The
CCDBG now absorbs several programs that were responsible for guaranteeing child care to those
existing on welfare, transitioning from welfare to work, and trying to avoid welfare through work (but
still at-risk for receiving welfare. See Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 603, 110 Stat. 2105, 2279 (1996).
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suffer from neglect, as well as generally inadequate care.'7 Inadequate care
may include malnutrition, lack of proper hygiene, disturbing and disruptive
living conditions, or being left in the hands of unsafe or inexperienced child-
care providers." Poor children have higher risks of death, cause of death
notwithstanding, than other children. 74 Furthermore, poor children have a
greater likelihood of stunted growth, substandard health, and leaving school
before high school graduation. "75 Circumstances of neglect or inadequate care
create the potential for real harm. Consistent with parens patriae, where such
harm exists, state agencies and judiciaries may intervene in family situations.
A vicious cycle thus begins in which state action becomes a primary factor in
jeopardizing the ability of parents to provide their children with adequate care.
The inability to provide adequate care, in turn, becomes a primary factor in
causing potential state intervention. Stopping this cycle may become even less
possible as welfare reform removes the concept of entitlement to governmental
assistance from the nation's consciousness.1 76
These statements ought not to imply that TANF has ravaged the AFDC's
rosier prospects for happy and healthy children. To be sure, inadequacies
existed under that program as well, particularly in funding for child care.7
The AFDC program seemed to engender circumstances that encouraged neglect
because, even at that time, the funds available in the budget of a family
receiving public assistance were far less than the cost of child care. 17 AFDC
parents received approximately $365 per year for child care, whereas quality
child care may reasonably cost more than $8,500 per year.179
Even when AFDC families could afford to pay, the quality of care their
children might have received at many child care centers was uncertain at best,
and downright dangerous at worst."ro Currently, safety and health conditions
in many centers are still substandard, although the costs of child care have
172. See Kindred, supra note 134, at 532.
173. See id.
174. See Children's Defense Fund, The New WetfareLaw: One YearLater, CDF Issues: Fair Start.
(Oct. 14, 1997) <htp:llwww.childrensdefense.org/fairstart oneyear.html> ("Poor children are three
times more likely to die from all causes compared to nonpoor children. They are two to three more
likely to have stunted growth and three times more likely to be in fair or poor health.").
175. See id. ("Poor children are more likely to fall behind in school and to drop out, compared
with middle-class and wealthy children. If lost benefits mean deeper and more prolonged child poverty,
the risks to children's well-being are great.").
176. See Kindred, supra note 134, at 521 (arguing for some "minimum level of state assistance
grounded in the constitutional right to assistance when necessary to protect and maintain family
integrity").
177. See Mark V. Nadel, Welfare Reform-Implications of Increased Work Participation for Child







risen six percent annually since 1990.181
The problem may have been and still may be that the states' protective role
in serving the best interests of children does not necessarily assure the best
possible child care."r2 Most states do not have laws to ensure that every
parent has access to high-quality child care."s Still, as the nation undergoes
the transition to PRA and TANF, the gap between supply and demand will
most likely increase. 4
At least from the anecdotal evidence, a crisis in child care supply does not
seem to have manifested itself. Although child care providers in Tulsa,
Oklahoma, expected to be inundated with demand, that expectation did not
materialize."8 Oklahoma welfare rolls decreased; however, day care enroll-
ment did not increase."ee Child care providers and officials in that state
hypothesized three possible scenarios:"8 first, children might be in unap-
proved day-care programs; 8 second, relatives and friends might be caring
for the children;189 third, and perhaps most frighteningly, the children might
be at home alone."9t Given that a family with an average annual income of
$17,000 might spend as much as one-fourth of its income on child care,'
the third scenario might be the most likely.
2. Other Obstacles
Other difficulties in successfully finding care may include having sick
children, infants, special needs children, and the before and after school needs
for care."9 Thus, parents with sick children, very young children, children
with disabilities and challenges, and a need for child care during unconvention-
181. See id.
182. Although the state governments have primary responsibility in the regulation of child care,
the lack of uniform standards and enforcement within and between states may not adequately protect
children's safety. See Children's Defense Fund, Federal and State Government: Partners in Child Care.
CDF: Fair Start (Oct. 14, 1997) <htp:lwww.childrensdefense.org/fairstart-oneyear.html>.
183. See NADEL, supra note 139.
184. See id. It is important to note that the PRA does attempt to facilitate the states' ability to
develop child care programs and policies that meet the growing child care needs of parents. See Pub.
L. No. 104-193, § 601-615, 110 Stat. 2105, 2278-87 (1996). Using federal CCDBG funds, states have
been able to improve low-income parents' access to child care services. See generally Clare Huntington,
Welfare Reform and Child Care: A Proposalfor State Legislation, 6 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 95,
111-23 (1996) (describing states' child care improvements under the 1990 CCDBG). States have not
necessarily achieved significant improvement in quality, however. See id. at 114.
185. See Michael Overall, Where Are the Children?, TULSA WORLD, July 12, 1997, at Al.
186. See id.
187. See id.




192. See The Impact of Welfare and Work Requirements on the Demand for Child Care: Hearings
Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 104th Cong. (1995) [hereinafter Hearings].
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al work hours may not find care." Because specialized child care is scarce,
finding care for infants or beyond the confines of nine-to-five work schedules
may be difficult and often impossible for many working parents.1" The job
hours of many low-income parents may be incompatible with away-from-home
child care, because the parents work at nights and on weekends." 9 This child
care market failure could pose a particular problem for welfare-to-work parents
who are entering a labor market in which "most new jobs will be in the service
sector during nonstandard hours.""'
Even if all other demands can be met, transportation to and from child care
providers can be a problem. 191 Parents must make child care arrangements
that not only fit their budgets, but also fit their work schedules and access to
reliable transportation. To the extent that the location of child care services
imposes additional costs in time and money for low-income families, all of
these factors-special needs, infant care, nonstandard hours, and transporta-
tion-contribute to the gap between supply and demand in child care. When
these factors go unaddressed, the likelihood increases that low-income parents
and children will suffer doubly from discontinuous and low-quality child
care' 98-if they can find any child care at all.
3. From Welfare to Wrk: The Human Stories
Newspapers across the country convey human interest stories regarding the
triumphs and trials of families in the transition from public assistance to fully
independent employment.1" Often, the challenges of finding appropriate and
continuous care for children weigh heavily in the ultimate success of the family
in becoming financially independent. For example, one mother asked to be
terminated from her job so that she could receive welfare.'m The mother
193. See id.
194. See Huntington, supra note 184, at 100-02.
195. See id.; see also Hearings (statement of Sandra L. Hofferth, University of Michigan Institute
for Social Research) (stating that one-third of working poor parents and one-fourth of working class
parents work weekends-almost one-half of poor parents have a changing work schedule that makes
stable care difficult).
196. Huntington, supra note 184, at 101.
197. See Hearings, supra note 195.
198. See id.
199. See, e.g., Margaret Edds, 3 Women's Cases Show the Pifalls, the Promise Following Welfare
Reform, VIRGInAN-PLOT, July 6, 1997, at Al1 (examining the lives of women in Culpepper, Virginia,
who are struggling to make the transition from welfare to work); Margaret Edds, Making Welfare Work:
Women at a Turning Point, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Feb. 24, 1997, at Al (contrasting the complicated life
stories of former welfare recipients with the simplified statistical accomplishment of getting people off
welfare); Louise Kiernan, Glimmers of Hope on Way to Work, CmH. TRIB., June 1, 1997, at C1
(describing the slow, yet hopeful moves of women on welfare toward financial independence); Elizabeth
Simpson, Making the Change, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, July 6, 1997, atAl (documenting the lives of women
making the transition from welfare to work as "a clue to the future of hundreds of people").
200. See Steve Levin, Hearing Shows Downside of Welfare Reform, PrITr.-POSr GAZEMr, Aug.
9, 1997, at A7.
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worked six days per week at a job to which she had to commute one hour each
way by bus. 10° Besides the transportation challenges, this mother paid $1,228
for just three months of day care services.2°2 This figure constituted over half
of the less than $800 she received in wages each month. 3 For her, like
many parents, the cost of child care made it economically inefficient to remain
employed.
This child care dilemma seems to be an inherent part of the new welfare
system. Parents who want to work cannot meet the rising costs of quality care
for their children, given the budgets that their low-paying scales of compensa-
tion create.' Parents are feeling the crunch of being caught through the
demands of the state and the demands of their children. The system does not
seem to recognize that dilemma.
Caseworkers and social workers recognize the system's shortcomings and
the problems with the new law.2 As caseworkers scramble to help families
make the effective transition from welfare to work, they race against time.'
They recognize that if these parents do not become self-sufficient, then their
children will suffer.' These professionals clearly attribute problems to the
"rigidity" of a system that seems not to have considered the realities of child
care in this nation.m Overall, problems of access to child care, especially for
parents with children who present special challenges (e.g., disabled and sick
children) frustrate the attempts of these professionals to facilitate the transition
from welfare to work.' Unfortunately, as the more easily employable
former welfare recipients are "creamed off" the caseloads, caseworkers and
social workers face even greater challenges with those adults who have
substantial employment qualifications issues such as illiteracy, drug addiction,
and mental health problems.21°
D. Conclusion
A system that removes financial support from children because their parents




204. See id. (describing one father whose job search includes applying for 15 jobs every week, but
worries that he will not be able to afford child care when he becomes employed).
205. See id.; Tracie Powell, Caseworkers Hear Welfare Clock Yck, AUGUSTA CHRON., May 12,
1997, at Al.
206. See Levin, supra note 200.
207. See id.
208. Levin, supra note 200.
209. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1612(a)(2)(A)(i)-(iii) (West Supp. 1997).
210. See id.
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especially in the situation of child care."' The social safety net for these
children is tom and tattered-and fast disappearing. 2  Without affordable,
quality child care for low-income parents, children living on the "economic
fringes" will suffer." 3 The situation of child care under the PRA presents a
federalism quandary because the state governments' implementation of the
federal government's goal of smaller welfare rolls not only may conflict with
the states' parens patriae obligations, but also may trigger the kind of neglect
and possible harm to children that evokes state intervention through the court
system. What resources states save in welfare expenditures, they may lose in
expenditures for the judiciary and child protection services. Indeed, the federal
government may just be asking the states to trade one set of expenditures for
another. The net savings in resources President Clinton sought when he signed
PRA into law may not exist in the current federal approach to child care.
Perhaps, in approaching the specific dilemma of child care and welfare reform,
we should remember that "[w]e are talking about some of the most powerless
people in society [children]. Therefore, we need sure ethical footing. We need
to be pretty confident before going forward that we will not do more
harm. "214
-Anita Krishnakumar and Shanna M. Cohn
I. THE UNEASY UNION BETWEEN LABOR AND WORKFARE
Imagine that a company was employing a large number of non-unionized
personnel to perform menial tasks such as sweeping the factory floor or
cleaning the company's bathrooms. What would organized labor's response to
this scenario be? Labor unions would attempt to unionize employees in order
to obtain better wages, benefits, and working conditions for these workers.
Organized labor would not think twice about confronting the corporation and
utilizing every tactic at its disposal to gain the best possible bargaining position
for these workers. Now, imagine that instead of a company, New York City
is requiring large numbers of workfare recipients to perform jobs such as
cleaning New York City Transit Authority tains and buses in fulfillment of the
211. See Margaret Edds, Welfare Reform in a Child's World, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, May 5, 1997, at
Al.
212. See Welfare Reform Seen from a Children's Perspective, 5 Child Poverty News & Issues,
Summer 1995, <http://cpmcnet.columbia.eduldept/nccp> (quoting Michele Piel, manager of Illinois
Department of Public Aid's Child Care Development Office, describing the disjuncture in the
expenditures of state resources on pre-kindergarten programs with a concern for low-income parents who
work unconventional hours and cannot use the programs); see also Low-Income Parents Choose Among
Limited Child Care Options, 2 Child Poverty News & Issues, Spring/Summer 1992, <http://cpmcnet.-
columbia.edu/deptnccp>.
213. See Edds, Welfare Reform in a Child's World, supra note 211.
214. See National Center for Children in Poverty <http://cpmcnet.columbia.edu/deptlnccp>
(quoting Douglas Besharov, resident scholar of American Enterprise Institute).
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workfare requirements of the PRA.21 5 Would organized labor's response be
the same in this situation as it was in the first scenario? In reality, the answer
is unclear. Labor unions are rushing to the defense of workfare participants and
pressing on their behalf for increased benefits and better working conditions.
However, instead of being motivated solely by the best interests of workfare
participants, unions are often acting in their own self-interest. Unions have
claimed that "states and municipalities, tempted by lower costs, [will] hire
workfare participants for positions that would usually be filled by unionized
workers."216 As a result, there is an uneasy union between the interests of
organized labor and workfare participants. In the current controversy over
workfare, mixed in with the traditional desire of organized labor to fight for
the best interests of workers is the desire for self-preservation.
This Part will chronicle the reaction of labor unions to the PRA and the steps
they have taken to ensure not only that workfare participants receive better
treatment, but also that their organizations remain viable. Section A will trace
the efforts of municipalities to place workfare participants in positions that are
normally held by unionized workers, thus leading to the current problem.
Section B will discuss the effort by unions to have workfare participants
declared "employees" under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938,217 and the
ramifications of that designation. Section C will analyze the legal and policy
issues of recognizing workfare participants as employees.
A. The Current Controversy
The PRA prohibits any able-bodied, childless adult between the ages of
eighteen and fifty from collecting food stamps for more than three months in
any three year period unless she works at least twenty hours per week. No
exception or exemption is provided for those recipients who cannot find work.
Welfare recipients with minor dependent children must work pursuant to
federal requirements or suffer certain penalties. For example, if a parent does
not fulfill her workfare obligation, then the parent will not receive her share
of the family's monthly welfare check for one month. Subsequent violations
can result in the entire family losing benefits for a finite period of time.
In order to comply with the PRA, states and municipalities have been
developing programs to place welfare recipients in jobs programs so that they
can meet their workfare requirement. It is estimated that the welfare reform
law requires "that 2.2 million welfare recipients be placed in workfare jobs
nationwide by the year 2002, including up to 200,000 in New York State ...
215. Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
216. Wage Laws to Apply to Work Programs, PACMs ON FILE WORLD NEWS DIG., May 22, 1997,
at 357 D2.
217. 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1994).
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New York City, which has the largest such program in the nation, is required
to expand its workfare force to 60,000 by 1998. "21' Indeed, New York City
has launched an enormous public jobs program in order to comply with the
PRA.2 19 New York City requires able-bodied adults without children who
receive benefits from the state's Home Relief Program to work twenty-six
hours each week in its Work Experience Program (WEP). In April 1996,
New York City began requiring those who receive AFDC to work at least
twenty hours a week or lose public assistance for their children.2"
Currently, New York City has the largest workfare program in the country.
Fifty thousand people out of 450,000 welfare recipients are already working
for their welfare benefits; 4,000 to 5,000 persons are expected to be added
each month; and more than 100,000 recipients are anticipated in the coming
years-' The new workfare participants do not receive any benefits besides
Medicaid, and effectively earn less than the federal minimum wage.
New York City's workfare program costs between $1,200 and $3,000 a
year per welfare worker.' This amount covers the supervision of the
program participants and the administrative costs of running the program, but
not the costs of child care which the city must pay as well.2 4 The total cost
incurred by New York City may well be $400 million, much greater than what
the federal government will provide.' In addition, New York State, like
other states, must meet certain federal targets or risk losing substantial amounts
of federal aid. In order for a state such as New York to receive all of the
federal funding to which it is entitled, twenty-five percent of adult welfare
recipients must be in twenty-hour per week work programs by the end of 1997
and an even higher percentage of welfare recipients must be in a workfare
program by 2002.1
While some states, such as Minnesota, place welfare recipients into private-
sector positions that are covered by federal wage and hour laws, other states,
including New York and Wisconsin, require welfare recipients to work in
municipal jobs or perform community service in exchange for their welfare
218. Steven Greenhouse, New York Union Leader Urges Halt to Broadening Workfare, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 23, 1996, at Al.
219. See Patricia A. Quigley, Note, Protection of Existing Workers and Implementation of
Workfare, HOFSrRA LAB. L.J. 625, 636 (1997).
220. See id.
221. See Karen W. Arensen, Workfare Rules Cause Enrollment to Fall CUNY Says, N.Y. TIMES,
June 1, 1996, at Al.
222. See Activists Call for End to State Workfare Program, TIMES UNION (Albany, N.Y.), Dec.
11, 1997, at B2; John Ziv, Give Union Rights to Workfare Workers, NEWSDAY, May 7, 1997, at A41.
223. Firestone, infra note 231.
224. See id.
225. See id.
226. See Rochelle Sharpe, Work Week: Welfare to Work, WALL Sr. J., Jan. 21, 1997, at Al.
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grants.' There is an incentive for states to utilize workfare participants in
municipal jobs such as cleaning parks or subway cars because the average
family welfare benefit is so low that it works out to about $2.40 per hour if the
recipient worked full-time to earn it. Unions argue that workfare participants
performing "clerical work and cleaning parks to receive welfare benefits, are
filling jobs previously done by union members. "
In describing the magnitude of the conflict between municipalities and
themselves, unions often cite the August 1996 contract negotiations between
New York City's Municipal Transit Authority (MTA) and the Transport
Workers Union-which represents the city's subway and bus workers. In
negotiating with the MTA, "[t]he best the union could do was to win an
agreement that 500 subway cleaning jobs would be eliminated without layoffs,
through attrition, as workfare recipients took over their tasks." 229 The
significant concession that the Transport Workers Union gained through
contract negotiations was the promise that "eventually a few workfare
recipients would be allowed to join the union in permanent, normal wage
jobs."" 0 However, a significant problem with the contract, as New York
City Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani's aides well recognize, is that "[t]he city...
has an agreement with its unions that workfare participants will never fill jobs
formerly held by unionized workers.""'
The problem underlying the Transport Workers Union contract dis-
pute-workfare workers displacing unionized municipal employees-is not
confined to the MTA. Labor unions representing painters and carpenters who
work for New York City contend that the city is violating an agreement
between unions and the Giuliani administration that the city not use workfare
participants to perform jobs once held by union members. The unions asserted
in their application for a temporary restraining order that the New York City
Parks Department "has cut its roster of unionized painters to [two] from
[thirty] a decade ago .... [and that the city has] illegally us[ed] welfare
227. See Workfare Fight; Honorable Work Deserves Honorable Pay, MINNEAPOIus STAR TRIB.,
June 22, 1997, at 24A.
228. Id.
229. David Bacon, Racing to the Bottom: Workfare May Make Things TougherAllRight-For Those
Who Already Have Jobs, PAc. NEws SERV., Dec. 17, 1996.
230. Id. If vacancies occur beyond the five hundred eliminated jobs, then some welfare recipients
will be hired for full-time positions. See Richard Perez-Pena, Transit Union Agrees to Allow Workfare
Plan, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 19, 1996, at Al.
231. David Firestone, Giuliani Attacks Transit Workers Accord and Threatens to Scuttle Union
Deal, N.Y. TIES, Sept. 20, 1996, at B4. As Richard Schwartz, senior advisor to the Mayor and
architect of his workfare program, stated:
The transit contract is phrased in a way that is dangerous and jeopardizes the overall workfare
program by stating that they will conduct an attrition program and replace those people with
people in workfare .... We have always held to the principle that workfare is a supplement
to the city work force but not a substitute. As a result, we have to separate ourselves from this
contract to preserve the overall program.
Id.
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recipients to fix park benches, repair the Coney Island Boardwalk and perform
carpentry at Downing Stadium, all work that was once done by unionized
workers." 2 The union official representing the painters stated that, "[the
Giuliani administration] fail to see the fact that they're replacing painters,
they're replacing civil service jobs, with [Work Experience Program]
workers. "23
Under the Work Experience Program-New York City's workfare
participation program-welfare recipients constitute seventy-five percent of the
Parks Department's work force, and approximately a third of those working in
the Sanitation Department.' It has been claimed that "[t]he fie cabinets of
union locals and advocate groups bulge with the names of people who were
once employed-with union pay and benefits-for the same organizations they
now work for in the WEP program."' 5 Perhaps one of the more extraordi-
nary cases of this sort of dja vu is that of Hadie Hartgrove, a workfare
participant formerly employed as a part-time custodian for Nassau County in
New York State. Hartgrove was laid off from her custodian job as part of
budget cuts, and subsequently applied for welfare benefits." As part of her
workfare assignment, she was assigned to her former job in Nassau County,
but without the higher wages and benefits she had previously enjoyed as a
regular employee. 7
While unions have advanced an overarching argument that the above
situations violate norms of fundamental fairness, they have yet to put forth the
stronger legal argument that conduct by municipalities in cases such as those
of Hadie Hartgrove may violate the displacement provisions of the welfare
reform law which prevents the replacement of employed individuals-either
through terminations or layoffs-with workfare participants." Municipalities
232. Steven Greenhouse, Workfarels Replacing Union Jobs, Lawsuit Says, N.Y. TIMES, May 24,
1997, at 23; see Eric Schine et al., Can Workfare Really Work?, BUS. WK., June 23, 1997, at 126.
233. Greenhouse, supra note 232.
234. See Melissa Healy, N.Y 'Workfare'Not So Fair AfterAll, L.A. TIMES, July 5, 1997, at Al.
235. Id.
236. See John Ziv, Viewpoints, Give Union Rights to Workfare Workers, NEWSDAY, May 7, 1997,
at A41.
237. See id.
238. See 42 U.S.C. § 684(c) (1994). Section 684(c) states:
No work assignment under the program (Grants to States for Aid and Services to Needy
Families with Children and for Child-Welfare Services) shall result in-
(1) the displacement of any currently employed worker or position (including part
displacement such as reduction in hours of nonovertime work, wages, or employment
benefits), or result in the impairment of existing contracts for services or collective
bargaining agreements;
(2) the employment or assignment of a participant or the filling of a position when
(A) any other individual is on layoff from the same or any equivalent position, or (B)
the employer has terminated the employment of any regular employee or otherwise
reduced it workforce with the effect of filling the vacancy so created with a participant
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cannot use workfare programs as a cost-cutting measure. They cannot layoff
union members who are well-paid in order to replace them with welfare
recipients whose jobs in workfare programs not only subsidize the cost of their
benefits, but also serve as a method of reducing these institutions' payrolls. 9
B. Workfare Participants as "Employees"
Although labor unions have not yet relied on the statutory provisions that
appear to prevent the replacement of employed personnel with workfare
participants, they have made use of other tactics in their struggle against states
and municipalities over the use of workfare participants. Labor unions actively
lobbied the Labor Department and the White House to find that workfare
participants are "employees" for purposes of the Fair Labor Standards Act
("FLSA"). In May 1997, the White House concluded that a proper interpreta-
tion of the FLSA dictated such a conclusion.' The most immediate ramifica-
tion of that decision is that workfare participants would have to be paid the
minimum wage-$5.15 per hour-for each hour that they are required to work
in fulfillment of their workfare obligations.241 Other potential consequences
are that in some states, workfare participants are automatically eligible for
workers' compensation and unemployment insurance, and that labor leaders
may be able to organize welfare recipients into unions.242
As expected, governors and state workfare administrators were extremely
critical of the Clinton administration's conclusion that workfare programs fall
within the "employee-employer" relationship governed by the FLSA, and
subsidized under the program; or
(3) any infringement of the promotional opportunities of any currently employed
individual.
Funds available to carry out the program under this part may not be us to assist,
promote, or deter union organizing. No participant may be assigned under section
682(e) or (f) of this title to fill any established unfilled position vacancy.
In addition, 7 C.F.R. § 273.22(f)(2)(viii) states:
Operating agencies shall not provide work to a workfare participant which has the effect of
replacing or preventing the employment of an individual not participating in the workfare
program. Vacancies, due to hiring freezes, terminations, or layoffs, shall not be filled by a
workfare participant unless it can be demonstrated that such vacancies are a result of
insufficient funds to sustain former staff levels.
239. See Farhan Haq, United States: Workfare Workers Worry About Labor Conditions, INTER
PRESS SERVICE, Jan. 15, 1997. The article states that "[a]ccording to some preliminary estimates
calculated by the New York Sanitation Department, workfare workers may earn as little as one-seventh
of regular trash collectors, and they also lack the unionized workers' health, retirement and vacation
benefits." Id.
240. See Jason DeParle, White House Calls for Minimum Wage in Workfare Plan, N.Y. TIMES,
May 16, 1997, at Al.
241. See id.
242. See id.
Yale Law & Policy Review
predicted grave consequences.' " However, the financial consequences of
classifying workfare participants as employees are not as dire as states have
been forecasting. Some states argue that they will not have the fiscal resources
to pay workfare participants. 2' Under the PRA, participants must work at
least twenty hours a week in 1997, and thirty hours a week by 2002.2" In
order to meet both the minimum-wage law and the hours requirement of the
welfare reform law, states must pay each welfare recipient at least $404 a
month this year and $657 in 2002. It is estimated that "[g]iven current funding,
only [thirty] states could meet the 2002 requirement,"' because of the
increased number of workfare participants and the hours that they will have to
work by 2002.
The White House attempted to soften the blow by arguing that states may
include the cash portion of welfare and the value of food stamps in calculating
whether welfare recipients are working for the equivalent of the minimum
wage. 7 According to White House estimates, "[f]or every state except for
Mississippi, the combination of food stamps and cash welfare is enough to pay
at least the minimum wage for [twenty] hours a week."2" Nevertheless, the
above statement is misleading, given the determination by the White House that
workfare participants are "employees" under the FLSA. Depending on state
labor laws, some states will have to pay additional compensation above the
minimum wage in the form of workers' compensation, unemployment
insurance and other benefits, thus raising the cost to them for each workfare
participant. 249
Reacting to concerns from state officials, congressional Republicans
proposed legislation to exempt those welfare recipients participating in
workfare programs administered by public agencies or nonprofit organizations
243. Governor Homas Carper of Delaware, a Democrat, has stated that the Clinton administration
has placed states in an "untenable position" because states might have to reduce the number of
participants in their workfare programs in order to meet the federally mandated levels for pay and
benefits. Editorial, Workfare Wages, ORANGE COUNTY REG., May, 19, 1997, at B6.
Further, while the Clinton administration's interpretation aids those in workfare programs, welfare
recipients participating in educational or training activities are not entitled to the wages mandated by the
FLSA because they do not stand in an "employee-employer" relationship.
244. See id.
245. The hourly totals per week may include time spent in training and obtaining employment.
246. Schine et al., supra note 232.
247. See Barbara Vobejda, Workfare Must Pay Minimum Wage, WASH. Posr, May 17, 1997, at
A6.
248. Elizabeth Shogren, Minimum Wage for 'Workfare' Favored, L.A. TIMEs, May 17, 1997, at
A13 (quoting Presidential advisor Bruce Reed). The Clinton administration's decision will have almost
no effect in California, because all workers, including former welfare recipients placed injobs through
state programs, receive at least the state minimum wage of $5.00 per hour. See id. The "Cal Jobs"
program has placed former welfare recipients in jobs that pay about $7.50 per hour. See id.
249. Other possible benefits could include paid vacation and sick days. See Melissa Healy, Group
Pushes to Limit Workfare Benefits, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1997, at A34.
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from receiving the minimum wage."S In June 1997, both the House Commit-
tee on Education and the Work Force and the House Ways and Means
Committee voted to exempt workfare participants in the above placements from
entitlement to the minimum wage.251 Later, Senate Republicans agreed to
implement this provision in the budget bill."s However, the proposed
provision was not included in the final budget bill that was passed last summer.
Yet, the effort to overturn the Clinton administration's decision on this issue
is not finished. House Speaker Newt Gingrich recently stated that one of his
objectives for the congressional session beginning in Fall 1997 was to pass
legislation denying the minimum wage to workfare participants not holding jobs
in the private sector."53
If Congress does enact legislation declaring that workfare participants are
not employees for purposes of the FLSA, then the effort by unions to gain
greater benefits for welfare recipients will be dealt a damaging, but by no
means decisive, blow. Unions will have to shift their efforts from the federal
level, where they have until now been concentrated, to the state level. In states
that do not recognize workfare participants as employees, and therefore refuse
to allow them to organize as union members, labor leaders have stated that the
"unions would try to organize such workers in informal groups to meet with
government officials and discuss working conditions-without formal
bargaining."' Up to this point, the push for greater benefits has been
virtually unsuccessful for the same reasons that state officials have pressed the
federal government not to recognize workfare participants as "employees":
Workfare participants are being trained to become productive workers, and are
fulfilling a duty to the state in return for minimal economic benefits.
In New York State, for example, unions have tried to overturn rulings by state
agencies that workfare participants are not "employees" and cannot be
represented by unions. 5  In April 1997, the New York State Assembly
250. See Robert Pear, G.O.P. in House Moves to Bar Minimum Wage for Workfare, N.Y. TIMES,
June 12, 1997, at B16. However, workfare participants in private sector jobs would still receive the
minimum wage. See id.
251. See id.
252. See Robert Pear, Republican Leaders Exempt 'Workfare'FromLaborLaws, N.Y. TIMES, July
19, 1997, at 7.
253. See Effort to Aid Recipients from Protections Fails, CI. TRIB., Oct. 12, 1997, at C7.
Gingrich's aims were immediately stalled by the lack of support from state GOP leaders. Many credit
political pressure from unions and a good economy with assuring that workfare workers receive benefits
equal to that received by other employees in the state. See Christopher Georges, GOP Drive to Deny
Workfare Benefits Sputters in States, WALL ST. J., Oct. 7, 1997, at A7. However, future downturns in
the economy may provide support for Gingrich's efforts.
254. Steven Greenhouse, Labor Leaders Seek to Unionize Welfare Recipients Who Must Go to
Work, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1997, at A18. In February 1997, the AFL-CIO decided to attempt to
unionize "hundreds of thousands of welfare recipients who will be required to work for their benefits,
with the dual goal of improving their working conditions and pressuring states and cities to give them
permanent jobs." Id.
255. See id.
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approved a revision of state welfare laws that would "make welfare recipients
employees of their city or county governments once they have been on
workfare assignments for six months. Upon becoming public employees,
welfare recipients could be organized by unions .... "16 As the bill is
doomed in the Republican-controlled New York State Senate, however, it is
simply a "one-house bill."' It is a symbolic device whose main purpose is
to placate one of the most powerful constituencies of the New York State
Assembly-organized labor.s So far, the only successful state effort to
unionize workfare participants has been Alaska, where the state, county, and
municipal employees' union has organized three hundred workers. 9 Alaska
allowed unionization of workfare participants because they were performing
work similar to that of union members covered by contract. 260 In attempting
to convince states that workfare participants should be considered employees
and allowed to organize into unions in order to bargain for greater benefits,
organized labor faces a truly Sisyphean effort.
C. Are Workfare Participant Employees?
Politicians of all political stripes have strenuously objected to treating workfare
participants as civil service employees."' They argue that workfare partici-
pants are not state or municipal employees because they receive government
aid such as cash grants, food stamps, and Medicaid. Moreover, even if one
contended that some workfare participants should be viewed as employees
because they perform services such as cleaning trains or parks, there are other
workfare participants who are only receiving job skills training, studying in
education programs leading to a high school diploma, or participating in
community service programs. As those participating in these alternatives to
workfare are not performing work comparable to that of municipal employees,
opponents to the inclusion of workfare participants as employees argue that
these welfare recipients surely have no rightful entitlement to a minimum wage.
Unions and advocates for welfare recipients contending that workfare workers
should be viewed as employees state that it is readily apparent that workfare
participants are performing similar tasks as unionized city workers, and that if
256. James Dao, Pleasing Their Allies, N.Y. TIMES, April 5, 1997, at 26.
257. Id.
258. See id.
259. See Greenhouse, supra note 254.
260. See id.
261. See CNN Morning News (CNN television broadcast, May 5, 1997) (Governor Pataki stated:
"It's utterly ridiculous, in my opinion, to propose that workfare recipients be unionized. The whole
concept of workfare is that it is a temporary transition."); Edward Epstein, Some Concessions on
Workfare; But S.F. Mayor Won't Budge on Equal-Pay Request, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 20, 1997, at A16




they were not doing this work, then city employees would have to clean the
streets, collect garbage, and dispose of medical waste. These proponents point
to the fact that workfare participants constitute a large portion of municipal
departments such as the New York City Parks Department and the New York
City Sanitation Department. They argue further that in New York City,
workfare participants have even been required to perform hazardous duties
such as disposing of blood bags and hypodermic needles and exterminating
rodents-tasks for which regular city employees receive a premium or
professionals are normally required.2 In order to secure decent working
conditions and adequate equipment, workfare participants sued New York City
for access to materials such as gloves-necessary when handling hazardous
waste products-and access to necessities such as bathrooms and drinking water
at outdoor working sites.' Thus, the argument concludes, workfare partici-
pants must be recognized as akin to unionized municipal employees because
they perform comparable work.
However, the above argument advanced by unions is too simplistic. It
neglects several important considerations about workfare workers. First,
workfare workers may be less efficient in performing their tasks than regular
employees because they have little incentive to devote their full energy to the
jobs they are assigned. Second, they may need more supervision then the
average employee because they may not have held previously a full-time job
or been trained to be disciplined workers. Third, workfare is an instrumentality
to place workfare workers into better jobs by teaching jobs skills such as
discipline and responsibility to the participants. Because workfare is meant to
be a temporary training program rather than a full-time career work assign-
ment, workfare participants properly should be viewed as trainees and not as
employees.
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit agreed that workfare workers
were not employees in Johns v. Stewart,' but offered a different rationale
than the one set forth above. The plaintiffs in Johns, a group of workfare
workers, claimed that the state unlawfully compensated them below the
minimum wage.' The court held that "workfare" benefit recipients were not
employees under the FLSA. Though the court recognized that the scope
262. See Betty Winston Bay, As Welfare Becomes 'Workfare, 'New York Provides a Look at the
Future, COURIER-I., Sept. 26, 1996, at All; Anemona Hartcollis, City is Hiring In anAssault Against
Rats, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 1997, at 29.
263. See Robert Ratish, Working In Fear of a Dead End, NEWsDAY, Sept. 1, 1997, at A8.
Workfare workers have alleged that there were no uniforms, and often no boots or gloves to use while
cleaning streets. See Joe Sexton, Discontented Workfare Laborers Murmur 'Union,'N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
27, 1996, at BI. A New York State Supreme Court ordered New York City to stop sending workers
to outdoor sites until conditions change. See id.
264. 57 F.3d 1544 (10th Cir. 1995).
265. See id. at 1548.
266. See id. at 1559.
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of employee coverage under the FLSA is very broad, it stated that the
"economic reality" is that workfare participants are not employees.e 7 This
"economic reality" consists of the following facts: employees apply for public
assistance, not for a state job; they receive their financial assistance checks
from a welfare agency, not from the state payroll; they do not pay withholding
taxes as do state employees; and they do not accrue sick or annual leave like
state employees.' However, the Johns court failed to consider that many of
the advantages of being a state employee were denied to workfare participants
because of cost concerns. Why would a state pay a workfare participant or give
him or her accrued vacation time unless forced to do so? Indeed, the court's
reasoning is specious. It had previously recognized that
[workfare participants] may perform the same functions as regular employees at
some of the projects to which they are assigned, [however] they differ from state
employees in that they do not receive the same salary, safe working conditions, job
security, career development, Social Security, pension rights, collective bargaining,
or grievance procedures as do the actual employees.'
Instead of using the state's differentiation among types of workers as a starting
point for its analysis, the court employed this difference as a conclusion. In its
simplest terms, the court's analysis is: Since the state does not treat workfare
participants in the same manner as regular employees, workfare participants are
not equivalent to regular employees. The state's predicate rationale for its
disparate treatment of the different types of workers is never investigated. As
the court realizes, the "economic reality" is that workfare participants and
regular employees perform the same work.27
While the result in Johns is correct, the court should have relied on other
factors in distinguishing workfare participants from state employees. The court
should have noted that if workfare workers were to be treated in the same
manner as state employees, then workfare workers should be allowed to
unionize. If workfare workers were allowed to join unions, there would be an
economic disparity between workfare program participants and regular
employees. Not only would workfare workers gain additional benefits, but they
presumably would not have the same tax burden as regular civil service
employees. In addition to noting that workfare participants perform work in
exchange for government benefits, the Johns court could also have distin-
guished workfare from regular employment by discussing the likely possibility
267. See id. at 1557. The Supreme Court has utilized an "economic reality" test to determine the
scope employee coverage under the FLSA in particular cases. Goldberg v. Whitaker House Coop., Inc.,
366 U.S. 28, 33 (1966). Under the economic reality test, a court focuses "upon the circumstances of
the whole activity." Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 730 (1947).
268. See Johns, 57 F.3d at 1558.
269. Klaips v. Bergland, 715 F.2d 477, 483 (10th Cir. 1983) (emphasis added). In Johns, the court
stated that "[alithough Klaips referred only to [other workfare] participants, its reasoning applies with
equal force [in this case]." Johns, 57 F.3d at 1559.
270. See Klaips, 715 F.2d at 483.
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that the state does not truly benefit from the work performed by workfare
workers due to the greater training and supervision needed when administering
a workfare program. The above factors would have further illuminated the
"economic reality" in Johns beyond the court's basic analysis.
Not all courts, however, have agreed with the result in Johns. For example,
in County of Los Angeles v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd.,271 the
Supreme Court of California held that an indigent who was required to work
for Los Angeles County as part of a workfare program was an "employee" of
the county under the state's Workers' Compensation Act.2' Under California
law, an employer-employee relationship must exist in order for a person to
bring a workers' compensation claim. The law defines an "employee" as
"every person in the service of an employer under any appointment or contract
of hire or apprenticeship, express or implied, oral or written .... "I
The workfare participant received back and leg injuries when he fell from
a chair while during his job as a watchman for a school district. The County
argued that because he was part of a workfare program he did not qualify as
an employee. In holding that the workfare participant was an "employee," the
court focused on a number of factors and found that:
The County, though it did not directly supervise his day-to-day activities, exercised
its right of control by assigning him to jobs. Also, the County determined [his] rate
of pay, specified the number of hours he was to work, and had the sole power to
terminate his benefits if he did not perform his work to the County's satisfaction.
The County received a benefit from [his] work, which helped to ensure the safety
of a school within the County's boundaries. Finally, by assigning Ihim] to work at
the school, the County exposed him to the same risks of employment faced by
similar school employees.' 4
The County of Los Angeles and Johns courts confronted a similar set of
circumstances-workfare participants being placed into comparable jobs as
regular employees and being exposed to similar risks. Nonetheless, while the
Johns court failed to extend workfare participants the same protections given
regular employees, the California Supreme Court concluded that, although the
government treated the two sets of employees differently, they actually differed
in no relevant respect. Municipalities were utilizing workfare participants as
employees, and those municipalities were gaining a benefit by not having to fill
the positions with civil service employees. In the view of the California
Supreme Court, the municipalities could utilize workfare employees only under
the constraints of the California Workers' Compensation Act.
271. 637 P.2d 681 (Cal. 1981).
272. See id. at 689.
273. CAL. LA. CODE § 3351 (West 1969 & Supp. 1997).
274. County of Los Angeles, 637 P.2d at 685 (emphasis added).
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Considering workfare participants as equivalent to regular employees can
profoundly affect the wages that workfare participants receive and the hours
that they must work. Recently, a New York State Supreme Court judge ruled
that New York City's workfare system improperly calculated the number of
hours that welfare recipients must work in order to receive benefits.275 The
city had calculated the number of hours based roughly on the federal minimum
wage.276 Justice Jane S. Solomon ruled, however, that the city had to base
its calculation on what the city pays regular employees for similar
tasks-approximately eight to ten dollars per hour in most cases. 277 Justice
Solomon held that the city had violated the New York State Constitution and
the state welfare law by failing to determine the prevailing wage of the
different jobs done by workfare participants and not paying the workers the
higher wage, whether it be the prevailing wage or the minimum wage. 278 The
New York City Comptroller calculated that the comparable pay of a grounds-
keeper employed to work in the city's parks was $9.08 per hour and that the
prevailing rate for clerical work in a social services office was $8.11 per
hour.
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The question of whether workfare program participants should be treated
as equivalent to regular municipal employees is one that will be fought in state
courts and legislatures and in the federal courts and Congress in the coming
months and years. In considering whether workfare workers are equivalent to
regular employees, these institutions should not lose sight of the fact that the
two types of workers are performing similar tasks, but the dispositive
consideration should be the fact that workfare programs are opportunities to
train welfare recipients to become productive workers in order to wean them
off of welfare. The traditional alternative to workfare has proven to be a hand-
out program without job-training or a requirement of social contribution.
Workfare participants should receive compensation for their services, but not
necessarily the same level of compensation enjoyed by those who have sought
employment without the incentive of a possible loss of welfare benefits.
D. Conclusion
While unions may cast welfare recipients as indentured servants, partici-
pants in workfare programs receive employment and valuable training.
275. See Brukhman v. Giuliani, 662 N.Y.S.2d 914 (Sup. Ct. 1997); see also Steven Greenhouse,
Judge Rejects a Formula for Benefits in Workfare, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 1997, at B3.
276. See id. at 919.
277. See id. at 921.
278. See id.
279. See Greenhouse, supra note 254. Justice Solomon's decision does not necessarily mean,
however, that workfare workers will be paid these wages, because the city has the option of reducing
the number of hours that workfare participants receive instead of increasing benefits to reflect the
prevailing wage. See id.
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Essentially, workfare workers are not employees. Because government agencies
are not interested in providing any protections to workfare participants that
might endanger their status as cost-effective alternatives to regular, unionized
employees, the question looms: Who will fill the vacuum and advocate on
behalf of these workers? In another time, this role would have been filled by
organized labor. The PRA and government agencies, however, have pitted
labor unions against workfare participants. Although unions have made
strenuous efforts on both the national and local fronts to enhance protections
for workfare workers, their advocacy stems not from a selfless generosity, but
rather from the fact that the cheap labor provided by workfare participants
threatens to obviate the more expensive services of unionized employees. In the
end, workfare participants may find that they would more effectively vindicate
their rights by suing for recognition as employees and for coverage under
prevailing wage laws, than by aligning themselves with groups that may not
have the poor and untrained workfare participant's best interests at heart.
-John P. Collins, Jr.

